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Abstract 
 Adaptive decision-making relies on a distributed network of neural substrates that 
learn associations between behaviors and outcomes, to ultimately guide future behavior.  
These substrates are organized in a system of cortical-striatal loops that offer unique 
contributions to goal-directed behavior and receive prominent inputs from the midbrain 
dopamine system. However, the consequences of dopamine fluctuations at these targets 
remain largely unresolved, despite aggressive interrogation. Some experiments have 
highlighted dopamine’s role in learning via reward prediction errors, while others have 
noted the importance of dopamine in motivated behavior. Here, we explored the precise 
role of dopamine in shaping decision-making in cortex and striatum. First, we measure 
dopamine in ventral striatum during a trial-and-error task and show that it uniformly 
encodes a moment-by-moment estimate of value across multiple timescales.  Our 
optogenetic manipulations demonstrate that changes in this value signal can be used to 
immediately enhance vigor, consistent with a motivational signal, and alter subsequent 
choice behavior, consistent with a learning signal.  Next, I measured dopamine in 
multiple cortical-striatal loops to examine the uniformity of the value signal.  I report that 
dopamine is non-uniform across circuits, but is consistent within them, implying that 
dopamine may offer unique contributions to the information processed in each loop.  
Finally, I performed single-unit recordings in the dorsal striatum, a major recipient of 
dopamine, to examine whether distinct its subcompartments—the patch and matrix—
 ix 
carry distinct value signals used in the selection of actions.  I report preliminary data and 
summarize improvements in my electrode localization technique. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
Adaptive decision-making is essential for survival. If the conditions necessary for 
comfortable survival were fixed— if there were always money in the bank account or 
always fruit on the tree— a simple set of fixed rules would be enough to get by.  In a 
changing environment, however, the conditions are flexible and the problem of survival 
reasserts itself in perpetuity. The animal must adapt to the changes or perish.    
Most of the decisions we make on a daily basis are not so dire, yet the neural 
substrates with which we make even trivial decisions evolved long ago and were likely 
refined by severe consequences. In this thesis I will investigate some of the underlying 
neural mechanisms of adaptive decision-making, with a particular emphasis on how 
decisions are evaluated (what is being learned) and how the evaluation is intertwined 
with motivation (how the learning is put to use).  
 
1.2 From the Law of Effect to Reinforcement Learning 
In 1905, psychologist Edward Thorndike noted that 'responses that produce a 
satisfying effect in a particular situation become more likely to occur again in that 
situation, and responses that produce a discomforting effect become less likely to occur 
again in that situation.'  This simple observation, what would later become the Law of 
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Effect (Thorndike 1911), foreshadowed more than a century of research that continues to 
grapple with understanding the nature of learning and motivation. Fundamentally, the 
Law of Effect recognizes the basic principles of instrumental conditioning. The 
probability of repeating a behavior increases when the behavior produces a satisfying 
effect. Moreover, this association can be drawn upon to modify future behavior to the 
potential benefit of the agent. After so many years, these basic features of Law of Effect 
still provide a useful framework for understanding how we learn.  It has been expanded 
and refined as the field has grown.   
The recent introduction of a family of algorithms called Reinforcement Learning 
(RL) is one such refinement (Sutton and Barto 1998). In a typical RL model, an agent 
interacts with a set of states, each with an associated value. Each time the agent 
experiences a state, the value assigned to that state is updated by a prediction error term.  
The prediction error is the difference between what was expected, based on the previous 
value, and what was experienced. Despite being designed for machine learning, these 
models have proven useful for providing a quantitative approach to studying instrumental 
learning and classical conditioning, based on the key features mentioned above.   
 
1.3 Does dopamine=RPE? 
 One of the most striking examples of an RL concept mapping onto brain activity 
is the finding that midbrain dopamine cell firing bi-directionally scales with the amount 
of unexpected reward that an outcome generates, similar to a reward prediction error 
(RPE) (Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski 1996; Wolfram Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 
1997). That is, in repeated pairings of a cue and a reward, dopamine cells fire more in 
early trials when a reward is surprising than in later trials when it is entirely expected. 
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There is also a temporal component to reward expectation. Dopamine cells fire more 
when a reward is delivered sooner than expected and show pauses in firing when an 
outcome is expected but not delivered on time.  The conclusion from these observations 
is that dopamine conveys a learning signal by comparing an expected amount of reward 
to a received amount of reward. 
 The idea that dopamine is equal to RPE, and thus provides a role in learning, has 
gained strong support.  More recent electrophysiology studies of dopamine cells have 
found evidence for this relationship in both probabilistic and deterministic variants of 
classical conditioning tasks (Bayer, Lau, and Glimcher 2007; Matsumoto and Hikosaka 
2009; Eshel et al. 2016). There is also some evidence of this relationship in terminal 
dopamine release patterns.  (Hart et al. 2014; Saddoris et al. 2015)  
 However, the support for the ‘Dopamine=RPE’ hypothesis is not universal (John 
D Salamone and Correa 2012; K. Berridge 2007; Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, and 
Hikosaka 2010b). Recent experiments offer evidence that questions the uniformity of 
dopamine signaling.  In tasks that require instrumental responding, such as maze running 
for reward (Howe et al. 2013) or lever-pressing for cocaine (Stuber et al. 2005), 
mesolimbic dopamine concentrations have been reported to gradually ‘ramp up’ from the 
onset of behavior until trial outcome, similar to a motivational signal.  Additionally, 
dopamine cell recordings have shown subpopulations that respond in a heterogeneous 
manner to aversive stimuli (Coizet et al. 2006; Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, and 
Hikosaka 2010a) and some cells that respond to unexpected salient cues, independent of 
reinforcement value, which are hypothesized to provide an ‘alerting’ signal (Bromberg-
Martin, Matsumoto, and Hikosaka 2010a). Attempts have been made to squeeze these 
observations into the ‘Dopamine=RPE’ mold (Niv 2013; Morita and Kato 2014; Lloyd 
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and Dayan 2015; Gershman 2014), incorporating refinements in modeling and language.  
Given these non-uniform findings about the activity of putative dopamine cells, is it not 
surprising that much work has been generated toward resolving this issue. 
 
1.4 A Unifying Account of Dopamine Function 
 One proposed resolution to the conflict between dopamine providing a learning 
signal or a motivational signal lies in the distinct modes of dopamine cell firing (A. A. 
Grace et al. 2007a). It has been suggested that phasic bursting events are responsible for 
the RPEs that convey a learning signal, while slower, non-synchronous ‘tonic’ firing 
alters extracellular dopamine tone and enhances or attenuates aspects of motivation (Niv 
et al. 2007; Daw, Kakade, and Dayan 2002; Guitart-Masip et al. 2011). In Chapter 2, we 
test this hypothesis directly by measuring dopamine on sub-second (phasic) and minute 
(‘tonic’) timescales while rats perform a stochastically rewarded trial-and-error task. We 
report that dopamine in the nucleus accumbens core conveys a motivational value signal 
on both timescales, and that the rapid (sub-second) fluctuations of this value signal are 
functionally equivalent to the RPEs that inform future choice behavior. This result is 
concordant with dopamine playing a role in both learning and motivation and thus 
provides a unifying account of dopamine function.  
 
1.5 Cortical-striatal loops offer unique contributions to decision-making 
 In the twenty years following the first Schultz RPE paper, much theorizing has 
predicted specific roles for brain circuitry and neuromodulators in carrying signals related 
to RL model parameters (Daw and Doya 2006; Daw, Niv, and Dayan 2005). These 
efforts have produced a modest renaissance in the computational modeling of how brain 
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circuitry performs adaptive decision-making.  An attractive integration of these efforts is 
the suggestion that distinct cortical-striatal circuits may processes discrete aspects of the 
decision and work in conjunction to arrive at an appropriate action or set of behaviors 
(Pennartz et al. 2009; Daw, Niv, and Dayan 2005; Cools 2015).   
 In a simplified mapping, these cortical-striatal loops can be reduced to a dorsal-
ventral neocortical axis projecting to a roughly dorsal-ventral striatal axis (Figure 1.1). 
The ‘executive’ loop (anterior cingulate and dorsal prelimbic neocortex to dorsomedial 
striatum) may carry information necessary for the overt modification of behavior. For 
example, this loop is involved in reversal learning (Ragozzino 2003) and arbitrating 
among candidate motor plans based on the accumulation of evidence (Shenhav, 
Botvinick, and Cohen 2013; Demanuele et al. 2015). Other likely roles for this ‘executive’ 
loop include performance and error monitoring, rule learning and rapid strategy switching 
(Seger 2009; Kehagia, Murray, and Robbins 2010)—all of which rely on a working 
memory of recent performance (Euston, Gruber, and McNaughton 2012). This type of 
overt valuation is more computationally demanding and may only be engaged when the 
cost of losing out on potential reward exceeds the cost of exerting executive control 
(Cools 2015; Shenhav, Botvinick, and Cohen 2013).  
 In a complimentary fashion, the ventral ‘motivational’ loop, also known as the 
limbic loop (ventral prelimbic and infralimbic cortex to NAc core and shell), integrates 
information about context, satiety, and reward history (J D Salamone, Cousins, and 
Snyder 1997)— decision variables that inform a state value (Houk, Joel L. Davis, and 
Beiser 1995).  This network is implicit in nature and drives instrumental responding and 
the learning of simple action-outcome associations (Robbins et al. 1989; Kelley and Delfs 
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1991).  The executive loop and motivational loop work in coordination to generate the 
range behaviors appropriate to the contingencies of the task at hand (Seger 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic diagram of cortical-striatal connectivity. Adapted from (Voorn et al. 
2004). 
 
 
1.6 A Universal Dopamine Signal? 
 Dopamine broadcasts a diffuse signal to the cortical-striatal circuitry outlined 
above, and is thus likely a key modulator in adaptive decision-making.  Yet, it remains 
unclear to what extent this signal is heterogeneous and further, whether the heterogeneity 
arises in the midbrain via distinct subpopulations of dopamine cells or at the terminal via 
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local metabolism and circuitry. Midbrain dopamine neurons receive a gradient of 
reciprocal inputs from their limbic and dorsal striatal targets (Voorn et al. 2004), which 
provide online feedback and alter the activity of subpopulations. Additionally, they 
project a distinct density of inputs to neocortex and striatum (Juarez and Han 2016), 
which originate from spatially organized portions of the ventral tegmental area and 
substantia nigra pars compacta (Lammel et al. 2008). Terminal dopamine concentration is 
also subject to differences in local metabolism and circuitry. There is a dorsal-ventral 
gradient of decreasing dopamine transporter availability in medial prefrontal cortex 
(Heidbreder and Groenewegen 2003), whereas there is a strong dependence on dopamine 
transporter in both dorsal and ventral striatum for synaptic dopamine clearance. These 
metabolic differences can impact how long dopamine stays in the synapse, which in turn 
affects the dynamics of D1- and D2- receptor occupancy.  
 Given such complexities of anatomy, it is unlikely that the dopamine signal is 
universal across the many networks involved in adaptive behavior. In Chapter 3, I 
address this hypothesis directly by simultaneously measuring extracellular dopamine in 
cortical and striatal targets while rats perform our adaptive decision-making task.  I show 
that while the dopamine signal does indeed vary across targets, there is a consistent 
relationship between dopamine and reward rate, an estimate of value, within at least one 
cortical-striatal loop—the ventral prelimbic neocortex and NAc core.  
 .  
1.7 Striatal Microcircuits and Value 
 The striatum is the major input nucleus of the basal ganglia and receives massive 
innervation from dopamine neurons.  It is critically involved in action selection and is 
hypothesized to achieve this through differential activity of the direct and indirect 
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pathways, which exclusively express D1- and D2- receptors, respectively.  The mapping 
of reinforcement learning onto neural processes has been most fruitful here, with specific 
evidence of action value (Samejima, Ueda, and Doya 2005) and prediction error (Oyama 
et al. 2010) signaling among the medium spiny projection neurons which comprise ~95% 
of its population.  In one framework (Maia and Frank 2011), the phasic bursts of 
dopamine that occur during positive prediction errors engage the normally unoccupied 
low-affinity D1 receptors, resulting in long-term potentiation at the synapses which were 
active during the action which produced the good outcome.  Conversely, the pauses in 
dopamine that occur during negative prediction errors decrease D2 receptor occupancy, 
resulting in a long-term depression at those synapses. In this way, selected actions that 
resulted with an unexpectedly positive outcome are reinforced and actions that resulted in 
an unexpectedly negative outcome are suppressed. 
 An additional layer of complexity emerges, however, when examining the 
expression patterns of mu-opioid receptors, choline acetyltransferase, enkephalin, 
calbindin, and substance P (Saka and Graybiel 2003).  There are clear 
subcompartments—the mu-opioid receptor rich patches and the mu-opioid receptor 
deplete matrix—which operate in parallel with distinct efferent and afferent connectivity.  
The matrix compartment comprises the majority of striatum, receives somatosensory 
input from superficial layers of cortex, and gives rise to the majority of the direct and 
indirect pathways. Patches receive preferential projections from anterior cingulate and 
prelimbic neocortex (Crittenden and Graybiel 2011; Eblen and Graybiel 1995; Friedman 
et al. 2015), specifically the ventral portion of the prelimbic region (Sesack et al. 1989). 
Patches send downstream projections to the basal ganglia, like matrix, but send a unique 
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projection to the dopamine neurons of the substantia nigra pars compacta (Fujiyama et al. 
2011).   
 The observation that patches have rather limbic connectivity and a unique 
influence on dopamine neurons has led to the hypothesis that they carry a state value 
signal, similar to the critic of an Actor-Critc RL model (Houk, Joel L. Davis, and Beiser 
1995; Daw, Niv, and Dayan 2005), while the matrix compartment signals specific action 
values. I describe my approach to testing this hypothesis in Chapter 4.  
 
1.8 Summary of Chapters 
 The goal of this thesis was to explore specific questions about the cortical-striatal 
circuitry that shapes decision-making. In Chapter 2, we tested whether dopamine 
provides a learning signal or a motivational signal. By optogenetically manipulating DA 
release at selective time points, we showed that DA can bidirectionally modulate both 
motivation and learning.  Moreover, we show that mesolimbic dopamine encodes value 
on fast and slow timescales. Fast fluctuations of extracellular dopamine concentration 
correspond with a value function, which estimates a moment-by-moment state value. 
Slow changes in extracellular dopamine concentration similarly corresponded with 
reward rate, an alternative estimate for the value of doing work.  
 In Chapter 3, I extend our previous work to investigate whether dopamine 
broadcasts the same value signal to multiple cortical-striatal loops, or whether the 
dopamine signal is distinct. I replicated my previous finding that minute-by-minute 
dopamine fluctuations in the nucleus accumbens core reflect reward rate. Unexpectedly, I 
found that dopamine also encodes reward rate in a corresponding neocortical afferent, the 
prelimbic cortex. I determined that this relationship was limited to the more ventral 
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portion of the prelimbic cortex, forming a ‘hotspot’ of value coding in the neocortex.   
This finding establishes that (i) dopamine in cortex and striatum can carry the same signal 
and (ii) this signal is confined to regions that interact in the same loop.  This finding 
relates well to human fMRI data showing the same hotspots are engaged across a range 
of tasks that require estimating subjective value.  
 In Chapter 4, I explore the hypothesis that anatomically distinct striatal 
compartments, the patch and the matrix, contribute unique value signals to decision-
making.  I describe challenges to testing this hypothesis and my evolving approach to 
recording from and identifying these compartments as well as the data collected thus far.    
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Chapter 2  
Mesolimbic dopamine signals the value of work
*
 
 
Abstract 
 Dopamine cell firing can encode errors in reward prediction, providing a learning 
signal to guide future behavior. Yet dopamine is also a key modulator of motivation, 
invigorating current behavior. Existing theories propose that fast (phasic) dopamine 
fluctuations support learning, whereas much slower (tonic) dopamine changes are 
involved in motivation. We examined dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens across 
multiple time scales, using complementary microdialysis and voltammetric methods 
during adaptive decision-making. We found that minute-by-minute dopamine levels 
covaried with reward rate and motivational vigor. Second-by-second dopamine release 
encoded an estimate of temporally discounted future reward (a value function). Changing 
dopamine immediately altered willingness to work and reinforced preceding action 
choices by encoding temporal-difference reward prediction errors. Our results indicate 
that dopamine conveys a single, rapidly evolving decision variable, the available reward 
for investment of effort, which is employed for both learning and motivational functions. 
                                                 
*
 Additional Supplementary Figures available in full published online format.  (Hamid, 
Pettibone et al. 2015) 
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2.1 Introduction 
 Altered dopamine signaling is involved in many human disorders, from 
Parkinson’s disease to drug addiction. Yet the normal functions of dopamine have long 
been the subject of debate. There is extensive evidence that dopamine affects learning, 
especially the reinforcement of actions that produce desirable results (J. N. J. Reynolds, 
Hyland, and Wickens 2001). Specifically, electrophysiological studies suggest that bursts 
and pauses of dopamine cell firing encode the reward prediction errors (RPEs) of 
reinforcement learning (RL) theory (W Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997). In this 
framework, RPE signals are used to update estimated values of states and actions, and 
these updated values affect subsequent decisions when similar situations are re-
encountered. Further support for a link between phasic dopamine and RPE comes from 
measurements of dopamine release using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry (FSCV) (Day et al. 
2007; Hart et al. 2014) and optogenetic manipulations (K. M. Kim et al. 2012; Steinberg 
et al. 2013).  
 There is also extensive evidence that dopamine modulates arousal and motivation 
(K. Berridge 2007; Beierholm et al. 2013). Drugs that produce prolonged increases in 
dopamine release (for example, amphetamines) can markedly enhance psychomotor 
activation, whereas drugs or toxins that interfere with dopamine transmission have the 
opposite effect. Over slow timescales (tens of minutes) microdialysis studies have 
demonstrated that dopamine release ([DA]) is strongly correlated with behavioral activity, 
especially in the nucleus accumbens (Freed and Yamamoto 1985) (that is, mesolimbic 
[DA]). It is widely thought that slow (tonic) [DA] changes are involved in motivation 
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(Niv, Daw, and Dayan 2006; Cagniard et al. 2006; John D Salamone and Correa 2012). 
However, faster [DA] changes also appear to have a motivational function (Satoh et al. 
2003). Subsecond increases in mesolimbic [DA] accompany motivated approach 
behaviors (Phillips et al. 2003; Roitman et al. 2004), and dopamine ramps lasting several 
seconds have been reported as rats approach anticipated rewards (Howe et al. 2013), 
without any obvious connection to RPE. Overall, the role of dopamine in motivation is 
still considered to be mysterious (John D Salamone and Correa 2012). 
 We sought to better understand just how dopamine contributes to motivation and 
to learning simultaneously. We found that mesolimbic [DA] conveys a motivational 
signal in the form of state values, which are moment-by-moment estimates of available 
future reward. These values were used for making decisions about whether to work, that 
is, to invest time and effort in activities that are not immediately rewarded, to obtain 
future rewards. When there was an unexpected change in value, the corresponding 
change in [DA] not only influenced motivation to work, but also served as an RPE 
learning signal, reinforcing specific choices. Rather than separate functions of phasic and 
tonic [DA], our data support a unified view in which the same dynamically fluctuating 
[DA] signal influences both current and future motivated behavior. 
 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Motivation to work adapts to recent reward history 
 We used an adaptive decision-making task (Fig. 1a and Online Methods) that is 
closely related to the reinforcement learning framework (a ‘two-armed bandit’). On each 
trial, a randomly chosen nose poke port lit up (Light-On), indicating that the rat might 
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profitably approach and place its nose in that port (Center-In). The rat had to wait in this 
position for a variable delay (0.75–1.25s) until an auditory white noise burst (Go cue) 
prompted the rat to make a brief leftward or rightward movement to an adjacent side port. 
Unlike previous behavioral tasks using the same apparatus, the Go cue did not specify 
which way to move; instead, the rat had to learn through trial- and-error which option 
was currently more likely to be rewarded. Left and right choices had separate reward 
probabilities (each was either 10, 50 or 90%), and these probabilities changed 
periodically without any explicit signal. On rewarded trials only, entry into the side port 
(Side-In) immediately triggered an audible click (the reward cue) as a food hopper 
delivered a sugar pellet to a separate food port at the opposite side of the chamber. 
 Trained rats readily adapted their behavior in at least two respects (Figure 2.1b,c). 
First, actions followed by rewards were more likely to be subsequently selected (that is, 
they were reinforced), producing left and right choice probabilities that scaled with actual 
reward probabilities (Samejima, Ueda, and Doya 2005) (Figure 2.1d).  
 Second, rats were more motivated to perform the task while it produced a higher 
rate of reward (Guitart-Masip et al. 2011; Wang, Miura, and Uchida 2013). This was 
apparent from latency (the time taken from Light-On until the Center-In nose poke), 
which scaled inversely with reward rate (Figure 2.1e–g). When reward rate was higher, 
rats were more likely to be already waiting near the center ports at Light-On (engaged 
trials), producing very short latencies. Higher reward rates also produced shorter latencies 
even when rats were not already engaged at Light-On, as a result of an elevated moment-
by-moment probability (hazard rate) of choosing to begin work (Figure 2.1h,i).  
 These latency observations are consistent with optimal foraging theories 
(Stephens 1986), which argue that reward rate is a key decision variable (currency). As 
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animals perform actions and experience rewards, they construct estimates of reward rate 
and can use these estimates to help decide whether engaging in an activity is worthwhile. 
In a stable environment, the best estimate of reward rate is simply the total magnitude of 
past rewards received over a long time period, divided by the duration of that period. It 
has been proposed that such a long-term average reward rate is encoded by slow (tonic) 
changes in [DA] (Niv, Daw, and Dayan 2006). However, under shifting conditions such 
as our trial-and-error task, the reward rate at a given time is better estimated by more 
local measures. Reinforcement learning algorithms use past reward experiences to update 
estimates of future reward from each state: a set of these estimates is called a value 
function (Sutton and Barto 1998). 
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Figure 2.1. Adaptive choice and motivation in the trial-and-error task. (a) Sequence of 
behavioral events (in rewarded trials). (b) Choice behavior in a representative session. 
Numbers at top denote nominal block-by-block reward probabilities for left (purple) and 
right (green) choices. Tick marks indicate actual choices and outcomes on each trial (tall 
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ticks indicate rewarded trials, short ticks unrewarded). The same choice data is shown 
below in smoothed form (thick lines; 7-trial smoothing). (c) Relationship between reward 
rate and latency for the same session. Here tick marks are used to indicate only whether 
trials were rewarded or not, regardless of choice. Solid black line shows reward rate, and 
cyan line shows latency (on inverted log scale), both smoothed in the same way as B. (d) 
Choices progressively adapt towards the block reward probabilities (data set for panels d-
i: n = 14 rats, 125 sessions, 2738 +/- 284 trials per rat). (e) Reward rate breakdown by 
block reward probabilities. (f) Latencies by block reward probabilities. Latencies become 
rapidly shorter when reward rate is higher. (g) Latencies by proportion of recent trials 
rewarded. Error bars represent s.e.m. (h) Latency distributions presented as survivor 
curves (i.e. the average fraction of trials for which the Center-In event has not yet 
happened, by time elapsed from Light-On) broken down by proportion of recent trials 
rewarded. (i) Same latency distributions as panel h, but presented as hazard rates (i.e. the 
instantaneous probability that the Center-In event will happen, if it has not happened yet). 
The initial bump in the first second after Light-On reflects engaged, after that hazard 
rates are relatively stable and continue to scale with reward history. 
 
 
2.2.2 Minute-by-minute dopamine correlates with reward rate  
 To test whether changes in [DA] accompany reward rate during adaptive 
decision-making, we first employed microdialysis in the nucleus accumbens combined 
with liquid chromatography–mass spectrometry. This method allows us to simultaneously 
assay a wide range of neurochemicals, including all of the well-known low–molecular 
weight striatal neurotransmitters, neuromodulators and their metabolites (Figure 2.2a), 
each with 1-min time resolution. We performed regression analyses to assess 
relationships between these neurochemicals and a range of behavioral factors: reward rate, 
the number of trials attempted (as an index of a more general form of activation/arousal), 
the degree of exploitation versus exploration (an important decision parameter that has 
been suggested to involve [DA]; see Methods) and the cumulative reward obtained (as an 
index of progressively increasing factors such as satiety).  
 We found a clear overall relationship between [DA] and ongoing reward rate (R2 
= 0.15, P < 10−16). Among the 19 tested analytes, [DA] had by far the strongest 
relationship to reward rate (Figure 2.2b), and this relationship was significant in six of 
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seven individual sessions, from six different rats (P = 0.0052 or lower in each case; 
Figure 2.2c). Modest relationships were also found for the dopamine metabolites DOPAC 
and 3-MT. We found a weak relationship between [DA] and the number of trials 
attempted, but this was entirely accounted for by reward rate; that is, if the regression 
model already included reward rate, adding number of attempts did not improve model fit. 
We did not find support for alternative proposals that tonic [DA] is related to exploration 
or exploitation, as higher [DA] was not associated with an altered probability of choosing 
the better left or right option (Figure 2.2b). [DA] also showed no relationship to the 
cumulative total rewards earned (though there was a strong relationship between 
cumulative reward and the dopamine metabolite HVA, among other neurochemicals; 
Figure 2.2b).  
 We conclude that higher reward rate is associated specifically with higher average 
[DA], rather than other striatal neuromodulators, and with increased motivation to work. 
This finding supports the proposal that [DA] helps to mediate the effects of reward rate 
on motivation (Niv, Daw, and Dayan 2006). However, rather than signaling an especially 
long-term rate of reward, [DA] tracked minute-by-minute fluctuations in reward rate. We 
therefore needed to assess whether this result truly reflects an aspect of [DA] signaling 
that is inherently slow (tonic) or could instead be explained by rapidly changing [DA] 
levels, that signal a rapidly changing decision variable.  
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Figure 2.2. Minute-by-minute dopamine levels track reward rate. (a) Total ion 
chromatogram of a single representative microdialysis sample, illustrating the set of 
detected analytes in this experiment. X-axis indicates HPLC retention times, y-axis 
indicates intensity of ion detection for each analyte (normalized to peak values). (Inset) 
locations of each microdialysis probe within the nucleus accumbens (all data shown in 
the same Paxinos atlas section; six were on the left side and one on the right). 
Abbreviations: DA, dopamine; 3-MT, 3-methoxytyramine; NE, norepinephrine; NM, 
normetanephrine; 5-HT, serotonin; DOPAC, 3,4-dihydroxyphenylacetate acid; HVA, 
homovanillic acid; 5HIAA, 5-hydroxyindole-3-acetic acid, GABA, ɣ-aminobutyric acid; 
ACh, acetylcholine. (b) Regression analysis results indicating strength of linear 
relationships between each analyte and each of four behavioral measures (reward rate; 
number of attempts; exploitation index; and cumulative rewards). Color scale shows p-
values, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons (4 behavioral measures * 19 
analytes), with red bars indicating a positive relationship and blue bars a negative 
relationship. Since both reward rate and attempts showed significant correlations with 
[DA], we constructed a regression model that included these predictors and an interaction 
term. In this model R
2
 remained at 0.15 and only reward rate showed a significant partial 
effect (p < 2.38x10
-12
). (c) An alternative assessment of the relationship between minute-
long [DA] samples and behavioral variables. Within each session [DA] levels were 
divided into three equal-sized bins (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH); different colors indicate 
different sessions. For each behavioral variable, means were compared across [DA] 
levels using one-way ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of reward rate 
(F(2,18)=10.02, p=0.0012), but no effect of attempts (F(2,18)=1.21, p=0.32), exploitation 
index (F(2,18)=0.081, p=0.92), or cumulative rewards (F(2,18)=0.181, p=0.84). Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey test revealed that the mean reward rates of LOW and HIGH 
[DA] differed significantly (p=0.00082).  
 
2.2.3 Dopamine signals time-discounted available future reward  
 To help distinguish these possibilities, we used FSCV to assess task-related [DA] 
changes on fast timescales (from tenths of seconds to tens of seconds; Figure 2.3). In 
each trial, [DA] rapidly increased as rats poked their nose in the start hole (Figure 2.3c,d), 
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and for all rats this increase was more closely related to this approach behavior than to 
the onset of the light cue (for data from each of the single sessions from all six rats). A 
second abrupt increase in [DA] occurred following presentation of the Go cue (Figure 
2.3c,d). If received, the reward cue prompted a third abrupt increase (Figure 2.3c,d). 
[DA] rose still further as the rat approached the food port (Figure 2.3c,d), then declined 
once the reward was obtained. The same overall pattern of task-related [DA] change was 
observed in all rats, albeit with some variation. [DA] increases did not simply accompany 
movements, given that, on the infrequent trials in which the rat approached the food port 
without hearing the reward cue, we observed no corresponding increase in [DA] (Figure 
2.3c,d).  
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Figure 2.3. A succession of within-trial dopamine increases. (a) Examples of FSCV data 
from a single session. Color plots display consecutive voltammograms (every 0.1s) as a 
vertical colored strip; examples of individual voltammograms are shown at top (taken 
from marked time points). Dashed vertical lines indicate Side-In events for rewarded 
(red) and unrewarded (blue) trials. Black traces below indicate raw current values, at the 
applied voltage corresponding to the dopamine peak. (b) [DA] fluctuations for each of the 
312 completed trials of the same session, aligned to key behavioral events. For Light-On 
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and Center-In alignments, trials are sorted by latency (pink dots mark Light-On times; 
white dots mark Center-In times). For the other alignments rewarded (top) and 
unrewarded (bottom) trials are shown separately, but otherwise in the order in which they 
occurred. [DA] changes aligned to Light-On were assessed relative to a 2s baseline 
period, ending 1s before Light-On. For the other alignments, [DA] is shown relative to a 
2s baseline ending 1s before Center-In. (c) Average [DA] changes during a single session 
(same data as b; shaded area represents s.e.m.). (d) Average event-aligned [DA] change 
across all six animals, for rewarded and unrewarded trials. Data are normalized by the 
peak average rewarded [DA] in each session, and are shown relative to the same baseline 
epochs as in b. Black arrows indicate increasing levels of event-related [DA] during the 
progression through rewarded trials. Colored bars at top indicate time periods with 
statistically significant differences (red, rewarded trials greater than baseline, one-tailed t-
tests for each 100ms time point individually; blue, same for unrewarded trials; black, 
rewarded trials different to unrewarded trials, 2-tailed t-tests; all statistical thresholds set 
to p=0.05, uncorrected). 
 
 
 The overall ramping up of [DA] as rats drew progressively closer to reward 
suggested some form of reward expectation (Howe et al. 2013). Specifically, we 
hypothesized that [DA] continuously signals a value function: the temporally discounted 
reward predicted from the current moment. To make this more clear, consider a 
hypothetical agent moving through a sequence of distinct, unrewarded states leading up 
to an expected reward (perhaps a rat running at constant speed along a familiar maze arm; 
Figure 2.4a). As the reward is more discounted when more distant, the value function will 
progressively rise until the reward is obtained.  
 This value function describes the time-varying level of motivation. If a reward is 
distant (so strongly discounted), animals are less likely to choose to work for it. Once 
engaged, animals are increasingly motivated, and so less likely to quit, as they detect 
progress toward the reward (the value function produces a ‘goal gradient’) (Hull 1932). If 
the reward is smaller or less reliable, the value function will be lower, indicating less 
incentive to begin work. Moving closer to our real situation, suppose that reward is 
equally likely to be obtained, or not, on any given trial, but a cue indicates this outcome 
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halfway through the trial (Figure 2.4a). The increasing value function should initially 
reflect the overall 0.5 reward probability, but if the reward cue occurs, estimated value 
should promptly jump to that of the (discounted) full reward.  
 Such unpredicted sudden transitions to states with a different value produce 
‘temporal-difference’ RPEs (Figure 2.4b). In particular, if the value function is low (for 
example, the trajectory indicating 0.25 expectation of reward), the reward cue produces a 
large RPE, as value jumps up to the discounted value of the now-certain reward. If 
instead reward expectation was higher (for example, 0.75 trajectory), the RPE produced 
by the reward cue is smaller. Given that temporal difference RPEs reflect sudden shifts in 
value, under some conditions they can be challenging to dissociate from value itself. 
However, RPE and value signals are not identical. In particular, as reward gets closer, the 
state value progressively increases but RPE remains zero unless events occur with 
unpredicted value or timing.  
 Our task includes additional features, such as variable timing between events and 
many trials. We therefore considered what the ‘true’ value function should look like, on 
average, based on actual times to future rewards (Figure 2.4c). At the beginning of a trial, 
reward is at least several seconds away and may not occur at all until a later trial. During 
correct trial performance each subsequent, variably timed event indicates to the rat that 
rewards are getting closer and more likely, and thus causes a jump in state value. For 
example, hearing the Go cue indicates both that reward is closer and that the rat will not 
lose out by moving too soon (an impulsive procedural error). Hearing the reward cue 
indicates that reward is now certain and only a couple of seconds away.  
 To assess how the intertwined decision variables, state value and RPE, are 
encoded by phasic [DA], we compared our FSCV measurements to the dynamically 
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varying state value and RPE of a reinforcement learning model (Online Methods). This 
simplified model consisted of a set of discrete states whose values were updated using 
temporal-difference RPEs. When the actual sequence of behavioral events experienced 
by the rat was given as input, the model’s value function consisted of a series of increases 
in each trial (Figure 2.4d,e), resembling the observed time course of [DA] (Figure 2.3c).  
 Consistent with the idea that state value represents motivation to work, model 
state value early in each trial correlated with behavioral latencies for all rats (across a 
wide range of model parameter settings). We identified model parameters (learning rate = 
0.4, discount factor = 0.95) that maximized this behavioral correlation across all rats 
combined and examined the corresponding within- trial correlation between [DA] and 
model variables. For all of the six FSCV rats, we found a clear and highly significant 
positive correlation between phasic [DA] and state value V (Figure 2.4f). [DA] and RPE 
were also positively correlated, as expected given that V and RPE partially covary. 
However, in every case, [DA] had a significantly stronger relationship to V than to RPE 
(Figure 2.4f). We emphasize that this result was not dependent on specific model 
parameters; in fact, even if parameters were chosen to maximize the [DA]:RPE 
correlation, the [DA]:V correlation was stronger.  
 Correlations were maximal when V was compared with the [DA] signal measured 
~0.4–0.5 s later (Figure 2.4g). This small delay is consistent with the known brief lag 
associated with the FSCV method using acute electrodes (Venton, Troyer, and Wightman 
2002) and prior observations that peak [DA] response occurs ~0.5 s after cue onset with 
acute FSCV recordings (Day et al. 2007). As an alternative method of incorporating 
temporal distortion that might be produced by FSCV and/or the finite speeds of DA 
release and update, we convolved model variables with a kernel consisting of an 
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exponential rise and fall, and explored the effect of varying kernel time constants. Once 
again, [DA] always correlated much better with V than with RPE across a wide range of 
parameter values. We conclude that state value provides a more accurate description of 
the time course of [DA] fluctuations than RPE alone, even though RPEs can be 
simultaneously signaled as changes in state value.  
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Figure 2.4. Within-trial dopamine fluctuations reflect state value dynamics. (a) Top, 
Temporal discounting: the motivational value of rewards is lower when they are distant 
in time. With the exponential discounting commonly used in RL models, value is lower 
by a constant factor ɣ for each time step of separation from reward. People and other 
animals may actually use hyperbolic discounting which can optimize reward rate (since 
rewards/time is inherently hyperbolic). Time parameters are here chosen simply to 
illustrate the distinct curve shapes. Bottom. Effect of reward cue, or omission, on state 
value. At trial start the discounted value of a future reward will be less if that reward is 
less likely. Lower value provides less motivational drive to start work - producing e.g. 
longer latencies. If a cue signals that upcoming reward is certain, the value function 
jumps up to the (discounted) value of that reward. For simplicity, the value of subsequent 
rewards is not included. (b) The reward prediction error (delta) reflects abrupt changes in 
state value. If the discounted value of work reflects an unlikely reward (e.g. probability = 
0.25) a reward cue prompts a larger delta than if the reward was likely (e.g. probability = 
0.75). Note that in this idealized example, delta would be zero at all other times. (c) Top, 
Task events signal updated times-to-reward. Data is from the same example session as 
Fig.3c. Bright red indicates times to the very next reward, dark red indicates subsequent 
rewards. Green arrowheads indicate average times to next reward (harmonic mean, only 
including rewards in the next 60s). As the trial progresses, average times-to-reward get 
shorter. If the reward cue is received, rewards are reliably obtained ~2s later. Task events 
are considered to prompt transitions between different internal states whose learned 
values reflect these different experienced times-to-reward. (d) Average state value of the 
RL model for rewarded (red) and unrewarded (blue) trials, aligned on the Side-In event. 
The exponentially-discounting model received the same sequence of events as in Fig.3c, 
and model parameters (ɑ=0.68, ɣ=0.98) were chosen for the strongest correlation to 
behavior (comparing state values at Center-In to latencies in this session, Spearman r=-
0.34). Model values were binned at 100ms, and only bins with at least 3 events (state 
transitions) were plotted. (e) Example of the [DA] signal during a subset of trials from the 
same session, compared to model variables. Black arrows indicate Center-In events, red 
arrows Side-In with Reward Cue, blue arrows Side-In alone (Omission). Scale bars are: 
[DA], 20nM; 
(f) Within-trial [DA] fluctuations are more strongly correlated with model state value (V) 
than with RPE (delta). For every rat the [DA] : V correlation was significant (p<10
-14
 in 
each case; Wilcoxon signed-rank test of null hypothesis that median correlation within 
trials is zero) and significantly greater than the [DA] : delta correlation (p<10
-24
 in each 
case, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Groupwise, both [DA] : V and [DA] : delta correlations 
were significantly non-zero, and the difference between them was also significant (all 
p=0.031, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Model parameters (ɑ=0.4, ɣ =0.95) were chosen to 
maximize the average behavioral correlation across all 6 rats (Spearman r = -0.28), but 
the stronger [DA] correlation to V than to delta was seen for all parameter combinations. 
(g) Model variables were maximally correlated with [DA] signals ~0.5s later, consistent 
with a slight delay caused by the time taken by the brain to process cues, and by the 
FSCV technique. 
 
 
2.2.4 Abrupt dopamine changes encode RPEs  
 FSCV electrode signals tend to drift over a timescale of minutes, so standard 
practice is to assess [DA] fluctuations relative to a pre-trial ‘baseline’ of unknown 
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concentration (as in Figure 2.3). Presented this way, reward cues appeared to evoke a 
higher absolute [DA] level when rewards were less common (Figure 2.5a,b), consistent 
with a conventional RPE-based account of phasic [DA]. However, our model implies a 
different interpretation of this data (Figures 2.4b and 2.5c). Rather than a jump from a 
fixed to a variable [DA] level (that encodes RPE), we predicted that the reward cue 
actually causes a [DA] jump from a variable [DA] level (reflecting variable estimates of 
upcoming reward) to a fixed [DA] level (that encodes the time-discounted value of the 
now certain reward).  
 To test these competing accounts, we compared [DA] levels between consecutive 
pairs of rewarded trials with Side-In events < 30 s apart (that is, well within the accepted 
stable range of FSCV measurements (Heien et al. 2005); for included pairs of trials, the 
average time between side-in events was 11.5 s). If the [DA] level evoked by the reward 
cue reflects RPE, then this level should tend to decline as rats experience consecutive 
rewards (Figure 2.5d,e). However, if [DA] represents state value, then baseline [DA] 
should asymptotically increase with repeated rewards while reward cue-evoked [DA] 
remains more stable (Figure 2.5f,g). The latter proved correct (Figure 2.5h,i). These 
results provide clear further evidence that [DA] reflects reward expectation (the value 
function), not just RPE.  
 Considering the microdialysis and FSCV results together, a parsimonious 
interpretation is that, across multiple measurement timescales, [DA] simply signals 
estimated availability of reward. The higher minute-by-minute [DA] levels observed with 
greater reward rate reflect both the higher values of states distal to rewards (including 
baseline periods between active trial performance) and the greater proportion of time 
spent in high-value states proximal to rewards.  
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 By conveying an estimate of available reward, mesolimbic [DA] could be used as 
a motivational signal, helping to decide whether it is worthwhile to engage in effortful 
activity. At the same time, abrupt relative changes in [DA] could be detected and used as 
an RPE signal for learning. But is the brain actually using [DA] to signal motivation or 
learning, or both, during this task?  
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Figure 2.5. Between-trial dopamine shifts reflect updated state values. (a) Less-expected 
outcomes provoke larger changes in [DA]. [DA] data from all FSCV sessions together (as 
in Fig.3d), broken down by recent reward history and shown relative to pre-trial 
“baseline" (-3 to -1s relative to Center-In). Note that the [DA] changes after reward 
omission last at least several seconds (shift in level), rather than showing a highly 
transient dip followed by return to baseline as might be expected for encoding RPEs 
alone. (b) Quantification of [DA] changes, between baseline and reward feedback (0.5-
1.0s after Side-In for rewarded trials, 1s-3s after Side-In for unrewarded trials). Error bars 
show SEM. (c) Same data as (a), but plotted relative to [DA] levels after reward feedback. 
These [DA] observations are consistent with a variable “baseline” whose level depends 
on recent reward history (as in Fig.4b model). (d) Alternative accounts of [DA] make 
different predictions for between-trial [DA] changes. When reward expectation is low, 
rewarded trials provoke large RPEs, but across repeated consecutive rewards RPEs 
should decline. Therefore if absolute [DA] levels encode RPE, the peak [DA] evoked by 
the reward-cue should decline between consecutive rewarded trials (and baseline levels 
should not change). For simplicity this cartoon omits detailed within-trial dynamics. (e) 
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Predicted pattern of [DA] change under this account, which also does not predict any 
baseline shift after reward omissions (right). (f) If instead [DA] encodes state values, then 
peak [DA] should not decline from one reward to the next, but the baseline level should 
increase (and decrease following unrewarded trials). (g) Predicted pattern of [DA] change 
for this alternative account. (h) Unexpected rewards cause a shift in baseline, not in peak 
[DA]. Average FSCV data from consecutive pairs of rewarded trials (all FSCV sessions 
combined, as in a), shown relative to the pre-trial baseline of the first trial in each pair. 
Data were grouped into lower reward expectation (left pair of plots, 165 total trials; 
average time between Side-In events = 11.35s +/- 0.22s SEM) and higher reward 
expectation (right pair of plots, 152 total trials; time between Side-In events = 11.65s +/- 
0.23s) by a median split of each individual session (using # rewards in last 10 trials). 
Dashed lines indicate that reward cues evoked a similar absolute level of [DA] in the 
second rewarded trial, compared to the first. Black arrow indicates the elevated pre-trial 
[DA] level for the second trial in the pair (mean change in baseline [DA] = 0.108, 
p=0.013, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). No comparable change was observed if 
the first reward was more expected (right pair of plots; mean change in baseline [DA] = 
0.0013, p=0.108, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). (i) [DA] changes between 
consecutive trials follow the pattern expected for value coding, rather than RPE coding 
alone. 
 
 
2.2.5 Dopamine both enhances motivation and reinforces choices  
 To address this question, we turned to precisely timed, bidirectional, optogenetic 
manipulations of dopamine. Following an approach validated in previous studies 
(Steinberg et al. 2013), we expressed channelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2) selectively in dopamine 
neurons by combining Th-Cre+ rats with DIO-ChR2 virus injections and bilateral optic 
fibers in the ventral tegmental area. We chose optical stimulation parameters (10-ms 
pulses of blue light at 30 Hz, 0.5-s total duration; Figure 2.6a,b) that produced phasic 
[DA] increases of similar duration and magnitude to those naturally observed with 
unexpected reward delivery. We provided this stimulation at one of two distinct moments 
during task performance. We hypothesized that enhancing [DA] coincident with Light-
On would increase the estimated motivational value of task performance; this would 
make the rat more likely to initiate an approach, leading to shorter latencies on the same 
trial. We further hypothesized that enhancing [DA] at the time of the major RPE (Side-
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In) would affect learning, as reflected in altered behavior on subsequent trials. In each 
session, laser stimulation was given at only one of these two times, and on only 30% of 
trials (randomly selected) to allow within-session comparisons between stimulated and 
unstimulated trials.  
 Providing phasic [DA] at Side-In reinforced choice behavior: it increased the 
chance that the same left or right action was repeated on the next trial, whether or not the 
food reward was actually received (n = 6 rats, two-way ANOVA yielded significant main 
effects for laser, F(1,5) = 224.0, P = 2.4 × 10−5; for reward, F(1,5) = 41.0, P = 0.0014; 
without a significant laser × reward interaction, P = 0.174; Figure 2.6c). No reinforcing 
effect was seen if the same optogenetic stimulation was given in littermate controls (n = 6 
Th-Cre− rats, laser main effect F(1,5) = 2.51, P = 0.174; Figure 2.6c). For a further group 
of Th-Cre+ animals (n = 5), we instead used the inhibitory opsin Halorhodopsin 
(eNpHR3.0). Inhibition of dopamine cells at Side-In reduced the probability that the same 
left or right choice was repeated on the next trial (laser main effect F(1,4) = 18.7, P = 
0.012; without a significant laser × reward interaction, P = 0.962). A direct comparison 
between these three rat groups also demonstrated a group-specific effect of Side-In laser 
stimulation on choice reinforcement (two-way ANOVA, laser × group interaction F(2,14) 
= 69.4, P = 5.4 × 10−8). These observations support the hypothesis that abrupt [DA] 
fluctuations serve as an RPE learning signal, consistent with prior optogenetic 
manipulations (Berridge 2007). However, extra [DA] at Side-In did not affect subsequent 
trial latency, indicating that our artificial [DA] manipulations reproduced some, but not 
all, types of behavioral change normally evoked by rewarded trials.  
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Figure 2.6. Phasic dopamine manipulations affect both learning and motivation. (a) 
FSCV measurement of optogenetically-evoked [DA] increases. Optic fibers were placed 
above VTA, and [DA] change examined in nucleus accumbens core. Example shows 
dopamine release evoked by a 0.5s stimulation train (average of 6 stimulation events, 
shaded area indicates +/-SEM). (b) Effect of varying the number of laser pulses on 
evoked dopamine release, for the same 30Hz stimulation frequency. (c) Dopaminergic 
stimulation at Side-In reinforces the chosen left or right action. Left, in TH-Cre
+
 rats 
stimulation of ChR2 increased the probability that the same action would be repeated on 
the next trial. Circles indicate average data for each of 6 rats (3 sessions each, 384 
trials/session ± 9.5 SEM). Middle, this effect did not occur in TH-Cre
-
 littermate controls 
(6 rats, 3 sessions each, 342±7 trials/session). Right, in TH-Cre
+
 rats expressing 
Halorhodopsin, orange laser stimulation at Side-In reduced the chance that the chosen 
action was repeated on the next trial (5 rats, 3 sessions each, 336±10 trials/session). (d) 
Laser stimulation at Light-On causes a shift towards sooner engagement, if the rats were 
not already engaged. Latency distribution (on log scale, 10 bins per log unit) for non-
engaged, completed trials in TH-Cre
+
 rats with ChR2 (n=4 rats with video analysis). (e) 
Same latency data as d, but presented as hazard rates. Laser stimulation (blue ticks at top 
left) increases the chance that rats will decide to initiate an approach, resulting in more 
Center-In events 1-2s later (for these n=4 rats, one-way ANOVA on hazard rate F(1,3) = 
18.1, p=0.024).  
 
 Optogenetic effects on reinforcement were temporally specific: providing extra 
[DA] at Light-On (instead of Side-In) on trial n did not affect the probability that rats 
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made the same choice on trial n + 1 (laser main effect F(1,5) = 0.031, P = 0.867) nor did 
it affect the probability that choice on trial n was the same as trial n − 1 (laser main effect 
F(1,5) = 0.233, P = 0.649).  
 By contrast, extra [DA] at Light-On markedly affected latency for that very same 
trial (Figure 2.6d). The effect on latencies depended on what the rat was doing at the time 
of Light-On (two-way ANOVA yielded a significant laser × engaged interaction, F(1,3) 
= 28.1, P = 0.013). If the rat was already engaged in task per- formance, the very short 
latencies became slightly longer on average (median control latency = 0.45 s, median 
stimulated latency = 0.61 s; simple main effect of laser, F(1,3) = 10.4, P = 0.048). This 
effect apparently resulted from additional laser-evoked orienting movements on a subset 
of trials. By contrast, for non-engaged trials extra [DA] significantly reduced latencies 
(median control latency = 2.64 s, median stimulated latency = 2.16 s; simple main effect 
of laser, F(1,3) = 32.5, P = 0.011; Figure 2.6d). These optogenetic results are consistent 
with the idea that mesolimbic [DA] is less important for the initiation of simple, cue-
evoked responses when a task is already underway (Nicola 2010), but is critical for 
motivating ‘flexible approach’ behaviors (Ikemoto and Panksepp 1999). 
 The shorter latencies produced by extra [DA] were not the result of rats 
approaching the start port at faster speeds, as the average approach trajectory was 
unaffected. Instead, extra [DA] transiently increased the probability that rats initiated the 
approach behavior. As the approach itself lasted ~1–2 s, the result was an increased rate 
of Center-In events ~1–2 s after the laser pulse train (Figure 2.6e). This effect of Light-
On laser stimulation on hazard rates was dependent on rat group (two-way ANOVA, 
laser × group interac- tion F(2,14) = 26.28, P = 0.000018). Post hoc pairwise comparison 
of simple laser effects showed a significant increase in hazard rate for Th-Cre+ ChR2 rats 
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(F(1,14) = 62.06, P = 1.63 × 10−6) and a significant reduction in hazard rate for Th-Cre+ 
eNpHR3.0 rats (F(1,14) = 6.31, P = 0.025), with no significant change in Th-Cre− ChR2 
rats (F(1,14) = 2.81, P = 0.116). Overall, we conclude that, beyond just correlating with 
estimates of reward availability, mesolimbic [DA] helps translate those estimates into 
decisions to work for reward.  
 
2.3 Discussion 
2.3.1 A dopamine value signal used for both motivation and learning 
 Our results help confirm a range of disparate prior ideas, while placing them 
within a newly integrated theoretical context. First, phasic [DA] has been previously 
related to motivated approach (Phillips et al. 2003; Roitman et al. 2004), reward 
expectation (Howe et al. 2013) and effort-based decision-making (Gan, Walton, and 
Phillips 2010), but our demonstration that [DA] specifically conveys the temporally 
discounted value of future rewards grounds this motivational aspect of dopamine 
fluctuations in the quantitative frameworks of machine learning and optimal foraging 
theory. This idea is also consistent with findings using other techniques; for example, 
fMRI signals in ventral striatum (often argued to reflect dopamine signaling) encode 
reward expectation in the form of temporally-discounted subjective value (Kable and 
Glimcher 2007).  
Second, using the complementary method of microdialysis to assess slower 
changes, we partly confirmed proposals that reward rate is reflected specifically in 
increased [DA], which in turn enhances motivational vigor (Niv, Daw, and Dayan 2006). 
However, our critical argument is that this motivational message of reward availability 
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can dynamically change from moment to moment, rather than being an inherently slow 
(tonic) signal. Using optogenetics, we confirmed that phasic changes in [DA] levels 
immediately affect willingness to engage in work, supporting the idea that subsecond 
[DA] fluctuations promptly influence motivational decision-making (Satoh et al. 2003; 
Adamantidis et al. 2011). This dynamic [DA] motivation signal can help to account for 
detailed patterns of time allocation (Niyogi et al. 2014). For example, animals take time 
to reengage in task performance after getting a reward (the post-reinforcement pause), 
and this pause is longer when the next reward is smaller or more distant. This behavioral 
phenomenon has been a long-standing puzzle (Schlinger, Derenne, and Baron 2008), but 
fits well with our argument that the time-discounted value of future rewards, conveyed by 
[DA], influences the moment-by-moment probability (hazard rate) of engaging in work.  
 Third, we confirmed the vital role of fast [DA] fluctuations, including transient 
dips, in signaling RPEs to affect learning (Hart et al. 2014; K. M. Kim et al. 2012; 
Steinberg et al. 2013). However, a notable result from our analyses is that RPEs were 
conveyed by fast relative changes in the [DA] value signal, rather than by deviations 
from a steady (tonic) baseline. This interpretation explains for the first time, to the best of 
our knowledge, how [DA] can simultaneously provide both learning and motivational 
signals, an important gap in prior theorizing. Our results also highlight the importance of 
not assuming a consistent baseline [DA] level across trials in voltammetry studies.  
 One interesting implication is that, among the many postsynaptic mechanisms that 
are affected by dopamine, some are concerned more with absolute levels and others with 
fast relative changes. This possibility needs to be investigated further, together with the 
natural working hypothesis that [DA] effects on neuronal excitability are closely involved 
in motivational functions (du Hoffmann and Nicola 2014), whereas [DA] effects on 
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spike-timing-dependent-plasticity are responsible for reinforcement-driven learning (J. N. 
J. Reynolds, Hyland, and Wickens 2001). It is also intriguing that a pulse of increased 
[DA] sufficient to immediately affect latency, or to alter left or right choice on 
subsequent trials, does not appear to be sufficient to alter latency on subsequent trials. 
This suggests that state values and left and right action values (Samejima, Ueda, and 
Doya 2005) may be updated via distinct mechanisms or at different times in the trial.  
 Although dopamine is often labeled as a reward transmitter, [DA] levels dropped 
during reward consumption, consistent with findings that dopamine is relatively less 
important for consuming, and apparently enjoying, rewards (K. Berridge 2007; Cannon 
and Palmiter 2003).  Mesolimbic [DA] has also been shown to not be required for 
performance of simple actions that are immediately followed by reward, such as pressing 
a lever once to obtain food (Ishiwari et al. 2004). Rather, loss of mesolimbic [DA] 
reduces motivation to work, in the sense of investing time and effort in activities that are 
not inherently rewarding or interesting, but may eventually lead to rewards (John D 
Salamone and Correa 2012). Conversely, increasing [DA] with drugs such as 
amphetamines increases motivation to engage in prolonged work, in both normal subjects 
and those with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (Rapoport et al. 1980; Wardle et al. 
2011). 
 
2.3.2 Dopamine and decision dynamics  
 Our interpretation of mesolimbic [DA] as signaling the value of work is based on 
rat decisions to perform our task rather than alternative ‘default’ behaviors, such as 
grooming or local exploration. In this view, mesolimbic [DA] helps to determine whether 
to work, but not which activity is most worthwhile (that is, it is activational more than 
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directional (John D Salamone and Correa 2012)). It may be best considered as signaling 
the overall motivational excitement associated with reward expectation or, equivalently, 
the perceived opportunity cost of sloth (Niv, Daw, and Dayan 2006; Niyogi et al. 2014). 
 Based on prior results (Gan, Walton, and Phillips 2010), we expect that [DA] 
signals reward availability without factoring in the costs of effortful work, but we did not 
parametrically vary such costs here. Other notable limitations of our study are that we 
only examined [DA] in the nucleus accumbens and we did not selectively manipulate 
[DA] in various striatal subregions (and other dopamine targets). Our functional account 
of [DA] effects on behavioral performance is undoubtedly incomplete and it will be 
important to explore alternative descriptions, especially more generalizable accounts that 
apply throughout the striatum. In particular, our observation that mesolimbic [DA] affects 
the hazard rate of decisions to work seems compatible with a broader influence of striatal 
[DA] over decision-making, such as setting ‘thresholds’ for decision process completion 
(Gan, Walton, and Phillips 2010; Nagano-Saito et al. 2012; Leventhal et al. 2014). In 
sensorimotor striatum, dopamine influences the vigor (and learning) of more elemental 
actions (Leventhal et al. 2014; Turner and Desmurget 2010), and it has been shown that 
even saccade speed in humans is best predicted by a discounting model that optimizes the 
rate of reward (Haith, Reppert, and Shadmehr 2012). In this way, the activational, 
invigorating role of [DA] on both simple movements and motivation may reflect the 
same fundamental, computational-level mechanism applied to decision-making processes 
throughout striatum, affecting behaviors across a range of timescales.  
Activation signals are useful, but not sufficient, for adaptive decision-making in 
general. Choosing between alternative, simultaneously available courses of action 
requires net value representations for the specific competing options (Gan, Walton, and 
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Phillips 2010; Morris et al. 2006). Although different subpopulations of dopamine 
neurons may carry somewhat distinct signals (Matsumoto and Hikosaka 2009), the 
aggregate [DA] message received by target regions is unlikely to have sufficient spatial 
resolution to represent multiple competing values simultaneously (Dreyer et al. 2010) or 
sufficient temporal resolution to present them for rapid serial consideration (McClure, 
Daw, and Montague 2003). By contrast, distinct ensembles of GABAergic neurons in the 
basal ganglia can dynamically encode the value of specific options, including through 
ramps-to-reward (Tachibana and Hikosaka 2012; van der Meer and Redish 2011) that 
may reflect escalating bids for behavioral control. Such neurons are modulated by 
dopamine, and in turn provide key feedback inputs to dopamine cells that may contribute 
to the escalating [DA] patterns observed here.  
 
2.3.3  Relationship between dopamine cell firing and release  
Firing rates of presumed dopamine cells have been previously reported to escalate 
in trials under some conditions (Fiorillo, Tobler, and Schultz 2003), but this has not been 
typically reported with reward anticipation. Several factors may contribute to this 
apparent discrepancy with our [DA] measures. The first is the nature of the behavioral 
task. Many important prior studies of dopamine (W Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997; 
Day et al. 2007), although not all (Morris et al. 2006), used Pavlovian situations, in which 
outcomes are not determined by the animal’s actions. When effortful work is not required 
to obtain rewards, the learned value of work may be low and corresponding decision 
variables may be less apparent.  
 Second, a moving rat receives constantly changing sensory input, and may 
therefore more easily define and discriminate a set of discrete states leading up to reward 
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compared with situations in which elapsed time is the sole cue of progress. When such a 
sequence of states can be more readily recognized, it may be easier to assign a 
corresponding set of escalating values as reward gets nearer in time. Determining 
subjects’ internal state representations, and their development during training, is an 
important challenge for future work. It has been argued that ramps in [DA] might actually 
reflect RPE if space is nonlinearly represented (Gershman 2014) or if learned values 
rapidly decay in time (Morita and Kato 2014). However, these suggestions do not address 
the critical relationship between [DA] and motivation that we aim to account for here.  
 Finally, release from dopamine terminals is strongly influenced by local 
microcircuit mechanisms in striatum (Threlfell et al. 2012) producing a dissociation 
between dopamine cell firing and [DA] in target regions. This dissociation is not 
complete: the ability of unexpected sensory events to drive a rapid, synchronized burst of 
dopamine cell firing is still likely to be of particular importance for abrupt RPE signaling 
at state transitions. More detailed models of dopamine release, incorporating dopamine 
cell firing, local terminal control and uptake dynamics, will certainly be needed to 
understand how [DA] comes to convey a value signal.    
 
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1  Animals and behavioral task.  
 All animal procedures were approved by the University of Michigan Committee 
on Use and Care of Animals. Male rats (300–500 g, either wild-type Long-Evans or Th-
Cre+ with a Long-Evans background (Witten et al. 2011) were maintained on a reverse 
12:12 light:dark cycle and tested during the dark phase. Rats were mildly food deprived, 
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receiving 15 g of standard laboratory rat chow daily in addition to food rewards earned 
during task performance. Training and testing was performed in computer-controlled 
Med Associates operant chambers (25 cm × 30 cm at widest point) each with a five-hole 
nose-poke wall, as previously described (Gage et al. 2010; Leventhal et al. 2012; Schmidt 
et al. 2013). Training to perform the trial-and-error task typically took ~2 months, and 
included several pretraining stages (2 d to 2 weeks each, advancing when ~85% of trials 
were performed without procedural errors). First, any one of the five nosepoke holes was 
illuminated (at random), and poking this hole caused delivery of a 45-mg fruit punch–
flavored sucrose pellet into the Food Port (FR1 schedule). Activation of the food hopper 
to deliver the pellet caused an audible click (the reward cue). In the next stage, the hole 
illuminated at trial start was always one of the three more-central holes (randomly-
selected), and rats learned to poke and maintain hold for a variable interval (750–1,250 
ms) until Go cue onset (250-ms duration white noise, together with dimming of the start 
port). Next, Go cue onset was also paired with illumination of both adjacent side ports. A 
leftward or rightward poke to one of these ports was required to receive a reward (each at 
50% probability), and initiated the inter-trial interval (5–10 s randomly selected from a 
uniform distribution). If the rat poked an unlit center port (wrong start) or pulled out 
before the end of the hold period (false start), the house light turned on for the duration of 
an inter-trial interval. During this stage (only), to discourage development of a side bias, 
a maximum of three consecutive pokes to the same side were rewarded. Finally, in the 
complete trial-and-error task left and right choices had independent reward probabilities, 
each maintained for blocks of 40–60 trials (randomly selected block length and sequence 
for each session). All combinations of 10, 50 and 90% reward probability were used 
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except 10:10 and 90:90. There was no event that indicated to the rat that a trial would be 
unrewarded other than the omission of the Reward cue and the absence of the pellet.  
 For a subset of ChR2 optogenetic sessions, overhead video was captured at 15 
frames per s. The frames immediately preceding the Light-On events were extracted, and 
the positions of the nose tip and neck were marked (by scorers blind to whether that trial 
included laser stimulation). These positions were used to determine rat distance and 
orientation to the center port (the one that will be illuminated on that trial). Each trial was 
classified as ‘engaged’ or ‘unengaged’, using cutoff values of distance (10.6 cm) and 
orientation (84°) that minimized the overlap between aggregate distributions. To assess 
how path length was affected by optogenetic stimulation, rat head positions were scored 
for each video frame between Light-On and Center-Nose-In. Engaged trials were further 
classified by whether the rat was immediately adjacent to one of the three possible center 
ports, and if that port was the one that became illuminated at Light-On or not (that is 
lucky, unlucky guesses).  
 Smoothing of latency (and other) time series for graphical display (Figure 2.1b,c) 
was performed using the MATLAB filtfilt function with a seven-trial window. To 
quantify the impact of prior trial rewards on current trial latency, we used a multiple 
regression model  
 
log10(latency)  β 1r1 + β 2 r t 2  β 10 r t 10  
 
where r = 1 if the corresponding trial was rewarded. All latency analyses excluded trials 
of zero latency (that is those for which the rat’s nose was already inside the randomly-
chosen center port at Light-On). For analysis of prior trial outcomes on left/right choice 
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behavior we used another multiple regression model, just as previously described (Lau 
and Glimcher 2005). 
 Latency survivor curves were calculated simply as the proportion of trials for 
which the Center-In event had not yet occurred, at each 250-ms interval after Light-On 
(an inverted cumulative latency distribution), smoothed with a three-point moving 
average (xt′ = 0.25xt − 1 + 0.5xt + 0.25xt + 1). These survivor curves were then used to 
calculate hazard rates, as the fraction of the remaining latencies that occurred in each 
250-ms bin (the number of Center-In events that happened, divided by the number that 
could have happened).  
 We defined reward rate as the exponentially weighted moving average of 
individual rewards (a leaky integrator) (Simen, Cohen, and Holmes 2006; Daw, Kakade, 
and Dayan 2002; Sugrue, Corrado, and Newsome 2004). For each session the integrator 
time constant was chosen to maximize the (negative) correlation between reward rate and 
behavioral latency. If instead we defined reward rate as simply the number of rewards 
during each minute (ignoring the contributions of trials in previous minutes to current 
reward rate), the relationship between microdialysis- measured [DA] in that minute and 
reward rate was lower, although still significant (R
2
 = 0.084, P = 5.5 × 10−10).  
 An important parameter in reinforcement learning is the degree to which agents 
choose the option that is currently estimated to be the best (exploitation) versus trying 
alternatives to assess whether they are actually better (exploration), and dopamine has 
been proposed to mediate this trade-off (Humphries, Khamassi, and Gurney 2012; Beeler, 
Frazier, and Zhuang 2012). To assess this we examined left/right choices in the second 
half of each block, by which time choices have typically stabilized (Figure 2.1d; this 
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behavioral pattern was also seen for the microdialysis sessions). We defined an 
exploitation index as the proportion of trials for which rats choose the better option in 
these second block halves (so values close to 1 would be fully exploitative, and values 
close to 0.5 would be random/exploratory). As an alternative metric of 
exploration/exploitation, we examined the number of times that the rat switched between 
left and right choices in each minute; this metric also showed no significant relationship 
to any neurochemical assayed in our microdialysis experiments.  
 
2.4.2 Microdialysis 
 After 3–6 months of behavioral training rats were implanted with guide cannulae 
bilaterally above the nucleus accumbens core (NAcc; +1.3–1.9 mm AP, 1.5 mm ML from 
bregma) and allowed to recover for at least 1 week before retraining. On test days (3–5 
weeks after cannula implantation) a single custom-made microdialysis probe (300-µm 
diameter) with polyacrylonitrile membrane (Hospal; 20-kDa molecular weight cutoff) 
was inserted into NAcc, extending 1 mm below the guide cannula. Artificial CSF 
(composition in mM: CaCl2 1.2; KCl 2.7, NaCl 148, MgCl2 0.85; ascorbate, 0.25) was 
perfused continuously at 2 µl min−1. Rats were placed in the operant chamber with the 
house light on for an initial 90min period of probe equilibration, after which samples 
were collected once every minute. Following five baseline samples the house light was 
extinguished to indicate task availability.  
 For chemical analyses, we employed a modified version of our benzoyl chloride 
derivatization and HPLC-MS analysis method (Song, Mabrouk, et al. 2012). Immediately 
after each 2-µl sample collection, we added 1.5 µl of buffer (sodium carbonate 
monohydrate 100 mM), 1.5 µl of 2% benzoyl chloride in acetonitrile, and 1.5 µl of a 
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13C- labeled internal standard mixture (total mixture volume 6.5 µl). The mixture was 
vortexed for 2 s between each reagent addition. Since ACh is a quaternary amine and thus 
not derivatized by benzoyl chloride, it was directly detected in its native form (transition 
146→87). Deuterated ACh (d4-ACh) was also added to the internal standard mixture for 
improved ACh quantification (Song, Hershey, et al. 2012) 5 µl of the sample mixture was 
automatically injected by a Thermo Accela HPLC system (Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
onto a reverse-phase Kinetex biphenyl HPLC column (2.1 mm × 100 mm; 1.7 particle 
size; Phenomenex). The HPLC system was interfaced to a HESI II ESI probe and 
Thermo TSQ Quantum Ultra (Thermo Scientific) triple quadrupole mass spectrometer 
operating in positive mode. Sample run times for all analytes were 3 min. To quantify 
neurochemicals in dialysate samples, we constructed six-point external calibration curves 
encompassing known physiological concentrations. Thermo Xcalibur 2.1 software 
(Thermo Fisher Scientific) automatically detected chromatographic peaks and quantified 
concentrations. To reduce noise each resulting minute-by-minute time series was 
smoothed with a three-point moving average (as above), then converted to Z-scores to 
facilitate comparison between subjects.  
 Regression analysis of microdialysis data was performed stepwise. We first 
constructed models with only one behavioral variable as predictor and one outcome 
(analyte). If two behavioral variables showed a significant relationship to a given analyte, 
we constructed a model with both behavioral variables and an interaction term, and 
examined the capacity of each variable to explain analyte variance without substantial 
multicollinearity.  
 To determine cross-correlogram statistical thresholds we first shuffled the time 
series for all sessions 200,000 times, and calculated the average Pearson correlation 
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coefficients (that is the zero-lag cross-correlation) for each shuffled pair of time series. 
Thresholds were based on the tails of the resulting distribution: that is for uncorrected 
two-tailed alpha = 0.05 we would find the levels for which 2.5% of the shuffled values 
lay outside these thresholds. As we wished to correct for multiple comparisons we 
divided alpha by the number of tests (276; number of cross-correlograms = 23 timeseries 
× 22 timeseries divided by two, as the crosscorrelograms are just mirror-reversed when 
the order is changed, plus 23 autocorrelograms).  
 
2.4.3  Voltammetry 
 FSCV electrode construction, data acquisition and analysis were performed as 
described (Aragona et al. 2009). Rats were implanted with a guide cannula above the 
right NAcc (+1.3–2.0 mm AP, 1.5 mm ML from bregma), a Ag/AgCl reference electrode 
(in the contralateral hemisphere) and a bipolar stimulation electrode aimed at the VTA 
(−5.2 mm AP, 0.8 mm ML, 7.5 mm DV). Carbon fiber electrodes were lowered acutely 
into the NAcc. Dopaminergic current was quantified offline by principal component 
regression (PCR) (Heien et al. 2005) using training data for dopamine and pH from 
electrical stimulations. Recording time points that exceeded the PCR residual analysis 
threshold (Qα) were omitted from further processing or analysis. Current to [DA] 
conversion was based on in vitro calibrations of electrodes constructed in the same 
manner with the same exposed fiber length. On many days data was not recorded due to 
electrode breakage or obvious movement-related electrical noise. FSCV recordings were 
made from 41 sessions (14 rats total). We excluded those sessions for which the rat failed 
to complete at least three blocks of trials, and those in which electrical artifacts caused 
>10% of trials to violate the assumptions of PCR residual analysis. The remaining ten 
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sessions came from six different rats. To avoid aggregate results being overly skewed by 
a single animal, we only included one session from each of the six rats (the session with 
the largest reward-evoked [DA] increase). Upon completion of FSCV testing, animals 
were deeply anesthetized and electrolytic lesions were created (40 µA for 15 s at the 
same depth as recording site) using stainless steel electrodes with 500 µm of exposed tip 
(AM Systems). Lesion locations were later reconstructed in Nissl-stained sections.  
 For between-session comparisons we normalized [DA] to the average [DA] 
difference between the pre-trial baseline and Food-Port-In aligned peak levels. To 
visualize the reward-history-dependence of [DA] change between consecutive trials 
(Figure 2.5h), we first extracted time series of normalized [DA] from consecutive pairs of 
rewarded trials (Side-In event to subsequent Side-In event separated by less than 30 s). 
For each session we divided these traces into ‘low-reward-rate’ and ‘high-reward-rate’ 
groups, using the (number of rewarded trials in the last 10) that best approximated a 
median-split (so low- and high- reward-rate groups had similar trial numbers). We then 
averaged all low-reward-rate traces, and separately all high-reward-rate traces.  
 
2.4.4  Reinforcement learning model 
 To estimate the time-varying state value and RPE in each trial, we used a Semi-
Markov Decision Process (Daw et al. 2006) with temporal difference learning, 
implemented in MATLAB. The model consisted of a set of states, with rat behavioral 
events determining the times of transitions between states. Each state was associated with 
a stored (‘cached’) value of entering that state, V(s). At each state transition a reward 
prediction error was calculated using  
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δ t rt Vt(st)− γ
−nVt(st−n)  
where n is the number of time steps since the last state transition (a time step of 50ms was 
used throughout), r is defined as one at reward receipt and zero otherwise, and 
specifies the rate at which future rewards are discounted at each timestep ( < 1). 
The V terms in the equation compare the cached value of the new state to the value 
predicted, given the prior state value and the elapsed time since the last transition (as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4c). Each state also had e(s), an eligibility trace that decayed with 
the same time parameter γ (following the terminology of ref. 21, this is a TD(1) model 
with replacing traces). RPEs updated the values of the states encountered up to that point, 
using  
 
V ′(s) V (s) α δ et (s) 
where α is the learning rate. V and δ were defined only at state transitions, and V was 
constrained to be non-negative. The model was ‘episodic’, as all eligibilities were reset to 
zero at trial outcome (reward receipt, or omission). V is therefore an estimate of the time-
discounted value of the next reward, rather than total aggregate future reward; with 
exponential discounting and best-fit parameters subsequent time-discounted rewards are 
negligible (but this would not necessarily be the case if hyperbolic discounting was used).  
 We also examined the effect of calculating prediction errors slightly differently  
 
 t rt γ
 nVt(st)−Vt(st−n)  
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 This version compares a discounted version of the new state value to the previous 
state value. As expected, the results were the same. Specifically, overall [DA] correlation 
to V remained ~0.4, overall δ correlation was ~0.2, and each individual session [DA] 
was significantly better correlated to V than to δ, across the full parameter space.  
 We present results using in the 0.9 to 1 range, because 0.9 is already a very 
fast exponential discount rate when using 50-ms time steps. However we also tested 
smaller γ (0.05–0.9) and confirmed that the [DA]:δ correlation only diminished in this 
lower range (data not shown).  
 To compare within-trial [DA] changes to model variables, we identified all 
epochs of time (3 s before to 3 s after Center-In) with at least six state transitions (this 
encompasses both rewarded and unrewarded trials). Since the model can change state 
value instantaneously, but our FSCV signal cannot (Kile et al. 2012), we included an 
offset lag (so we actually compared V and δ to [DA] a few measurements later). The 
size of the lag affected the magnitude of the observed correlations (Figure 2.4f), but not 
the basic result. Results were also unchanged if (instead of a lag) we convolved model 
variables with a kernel consisting of an exponential rise and fall, demonstrating that our 
results are not a simple artifact of time delays associated with the FSCV method or 
sluggish reuptake. Finally, we also tried using the SMDP model with hyperbolic (instead 
of exponential) discounting (Mazur 1986; Ainslie 2005; Kobayashi and Schultz 2008; 
Kacelnik 1997), and again found a consistently stronger correlation between [DA] and V 
than between [DA] and δ (data not shown).  
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2.4.5  Optogenetics 
 We used three groups of rats to assess the behavioral effects of VTA DA cell 
manipulations (first Th-Cre+ with AAV-EF1 -DIO-ChR2-EYFP virus, then littermate 
Th-Cre− with the same virus, then Th-Cre+ with AAV- EF1 -DIO-eNpHR3.0-EYFP). 
All virus was produced at the University of North Carolina vector core. In each case rats 
received bilateral viral injections (0.5 or 1 μl per hemisphere at 50 nl min−1) into the 
VTA (same coordinates as above). After 3 weeks, we placed bilateral optic fibers (200-
m diameter) under ketamine/xylazine anesthesia with FSCV guidance, at an angle of 6° 
from the sagittal plane, stopping at a location that yielded the most laser-evoked [DA] 
release in NAc. Once cemented in place, we used FSCV to test multiple sets of 
stimulation parameters from a 445-nm blue laser diode (Casio) with Arroyo Instruments 
driver under LabView control. The parameters chosen for behavioral experiments (0.5-s 
train of 10-ms pulses at 30 Hz, 20 mW power at tip) typically produced [DA] increases in 
Th-Cre+ / ChR2 rats comparable to those seen with unexpected reward delivery. All rats 
were allowed to recover from surgery and retrained to pre-surgery performance. 
Combined behavioral / optogenetic experiments began 5 weeks after virus injection. On 
alternate days, sessions either included bilateral laser stimulation (on a randomly selected 
30% of trials, regardless of block or outcome), or not. In this manner, each rat received 
three sessions of Light-On stimulations and three sessions of Side-In stimulation, 
interleaved with control (no laser) sessions, over a 2-week period. Halorhodopsin rats 
were tested with 1 s of constant 20-mW illumination from a 589-nm (yellow/orange) 
laser (OEM Systems), starting either at Light-On or Side-In as above. One Th-Cre+ 
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/ChR2 rat was excluded from analyses due to misplaced virus (no viral expression 
directly below the optic fiber tips).  
 For statistical analysis of optogenetic effects on behavior we used repeated 
measure ANOVA models, in SPSS. For each rat we first averaged data across the three 
sessions with the same optogenetic conditions. Then, to assess reinforcing effects we 
examined the two factors of LASER (off versus on) and REWARD (rewarded versus 
omission), with the dependent measure the probability that the same action was repeated 
on the next trial. For assessing effects on median latency we examined the two factors of 
LASER (off versus on) and ENGAGED (yes versus no). For assessing group-dependent 
effects on hazard rate we examined the factors of LASER (off versus on) and GROUP 
(Th-Cre+ /ChR2; Th-Cre− /ChR2; Th-Cre+ /eNpHR3.0), with the dependent measure 
the average hazard rate during the epoch 1–2.5 s after Light-On. This epoch was chosen 
since it is 1–2 s after the laser stimulation period (0–0.5 s) and approach behaviors have a 
consistent duration of ~1–2 s. Post hoc tests were Bonferroni-corrected for multiple 
comparisons.  
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7.  Reward rate affects the decision to begin work. Latency distributions are 
bimodal, and depend on reward rate. Very short latencies (early peak) preferentially 
occur when a greater proportion of recent trials have been rewarded (same data set as Fig 
1d–i). (b) (top) Schematic of video analysis. Each trial was categorized as “engaged” 
(already waiting for Light-On) or non-engaged based upon distance (s) and orientation 
(θ) immediately before Light-On (see Methods). (bottom) Arrows indicate rat head 
position and orientation for engaged (pink) and non-engaged (green) trials (one example 
session shown). (c) Categorization into engaged, non-engaged trials accounts for bimodal 
latency distribution (data shown are all non-laser trials across 12 ChR2 sessions in TH-
Cre+ rats). (d) Proportion of engaged trials increases when more recent trials have been 
rewarded (3336 trials from 4 rats, r=0.82, p=0.003). (e) Especially for non-engaged trials, 
latencies are lower when reward rate is higher (r=−0.11,p=0.004 for 1570 engaged trials, 
r=−0.18, p=5.2×10−19 for 1766 non-engaged trials). 
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Figure 2.8. Individual microdialysis sessions. Each row shows data for a different session, 
with indicated rat ID (e.g. IM463) and recording side (LH = left, RH=right). From left: 
dialysis probe location, behavioral and [DA] time courses, and individual session 
correlations to behavioral variables. Reward rate is in units of rewards per min. Numbers 
of microdialysis samples for each of the seven sessions: 86,72,39,39,68,73,67 
respectively. The overall relationship between dopamine and reward rate remained highly 
significant even if excluding periods of inactivity (defined as no trials initiated for >2 
minutes, shaded in green; regression R
2
 = 0.12, p = 1.4 × 10
−13
). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9.  Cross-correlograms for behavioral variables and neurochemicals. Each plot 
shows cross-correlograms averaged across all microdialysis sessions, all using the same 
axes (−20min to +20min lags, −0.5 to +1 correlation). Colored lines indicate statistical 
thresholds corrected for multiple comparisons (see Methods). Many neurochemical pairs 
show no evidence of covariation, but others display strong relationships including a 
cluster of glutamate, serine, aspartate and glycine. 
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Figure 2.10.  Individual voltammetry sessions. Each row shows data for a different rat 
(e.g. IM355, which was also used as the example in Figs. 2.3, 2.4). At left, recording site 
within nucleus accumbens. Middle panels show behavioral data for the FSCV session 
(same format as Fig. 2.1). Right panels show individual FSCV data (same format as Fig. 
2.3, but with additional event alignments). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11.  SMDP model. (a) Task performance was modeled as a sequence of 
transitions between states of the agent (rat). Each state had a single associated cached 
value V(s) (rather than, for example, separate state-action (Q) values for leftward and 
rightward trials). Most state transitions occur at variable times (hence “semi-Markov”) 
marked by observed external events (Center-In, Go-Cue, etc). In contrast, the state 
sequence between Side-Out and Reward Port In is arbitrarily defined (“Approaching 
Reward Port” begins 1s before Reward Port In; “Arriving At Reward Port” begins 0.5s 
before Reward Port In). Changing the number or specific timing of these intermediate 
states does not materially affect the rising shape of the value function. (b) Average 
correlation (color scale = Spearman’s r) between SMDP model state value at Center-In 
(Vci) and latency across all six FSCV rats, for a range of learning rates ɑ and exponential 
discounting time constants ɣ. Note that color scale is inverted (red indicates strongest 
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negative relationship, with higher value corresponding to shorter latency). White dot 
marks point of strongest relationship (ɑ=0.40, ɣ=0.95). (c) Correlation between [DA] and 
state value V is stronger than the correlation between [DA] and reward prediction error δ, 
across the same range of parameters. Color scale at right is the same for both matrices 
(Spearman’s r). 
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Figure 2.12.  Dopamine relationships to temporally-stretched model variables. (a) Kernel 
consisted of an exponential rise (to 50% of asymptote) and an exponential fall, with 
separate time constants. (b) Within-trial correlation coefficients between [DA] and 
kernel-convolved model variables V and δ, for a range of rise and fall time constants (0 – 
Nature Neuroscience: doi:10.1038/nn.4173
 59 
1.5s each, in 50ms timesteps, using data from all 6 rats). Regardless of parameter values, 
[DA] correlations to V were always higher than to δ. (c) Same example data as Fig. 2.4E, 
but also showing convolved V and δ (using time constants that maximized correlation to 
[DA] in each case). (d) Trial-by-trial (top) and average (bottom) [DA], convolved V, and 
convolved δ, for the same session as Fig. 2.4d,e. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13.  Histology for behavioral optogenetic experiments. Identifier (e.g. “IM389”) 
for each rat is given at bottom right corner. Coronal sections shown are within 180µm 
(anterior-posterior) of the observed fiber tip location. Green indicates expression of eYFP, 
blue is DAPI counterstain. In a couple of cases (IM423, IM441) autofluorescence of 
damaged brain tissue is visible along the optic fiber tracts; this was not specific to the 
green channel. 
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Figure 2.14.  Further analysis of persistence of optogenetic effects. (a) Regression 
analysis showing substantial effects of recent rewards (black) on latency, but no 
comparable effect of recent Side-In laser stimulations on latency. (b) Effects of Light-On 
[DA] manipulation on same-trial latency distributions (top), and of Side-In [DA] 
manipulation on next-trial latency distributions (bottom). Dataset shown is the same as 
Fig. 2.6c, i.e. all completed trials in TH-Cre+ rats with ChR2 (left), TH-Cre
−
 rats with 
ChR2 (middle) and TH-Cre+ rats with halorhodopsin (right). (c) Regression analysis of 
laser stimulation on subsequent left/right choices. Recent food rewards for a given 
left/right action increase the probability that it will be repeated. Extra [DA] at Light-On 
has little or no effect on subsequent choices, but extra [DA] at Side-In is persistently 
reinforcing. For the Side-In data, note especially the positive coefficients for otherwise 
unrewarded laser trials. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15.  Video analysis of optogenetic effects on latency. (a) Extra [DA] at Light-On 
causes shorter latencies for non-engaged trials, but longer latencies for a subset of 
engaged trials. Top plot shows all trials (for the n=4 TH-Cre+ rats with ChR2 stimulation 
at Light-On for which video was recorded; 3 sessions/rat; 3336 no-laser trials in grey; 
1335 laser trials in blue). Bottom plots show the breakdown into engaged (n=1975) and 
non-engaged (n=2696) trials. (b) We examined whether laser-slowed trials might be those 
in which the rat was waiting at the wrong port (if, for example, DA were to increase the 
salience of currently attended stimuli). Engaged trials were further broken down into 
“lucky guesses” (those trials for which the rat was immediately adjacent to the start port 
as it was illuminated) and “unlucky guesses” (immediately adjacent to one of the other 
two possible start ports). Blue dashed ellipses indicate zones used to classify trials by 
guessed port (8.5cm long diameter, 3.4cm short diameter) (c) Laser-slowing was 
observed for both lucky (n=603) and unlucky (n=1007) guesses. Note that blue 
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distribution is bimodal in both cases, indicating that only a subset of trials were affected. 
Video observations suggested that on some trials extra [DA] evokes a small extra 
head/neck movement, that makes the trajectory to the illuminated port longer and 
therefore slower. (d) Quantification of trajectories, by scoring rat location on each video 
frame from 1s before Light-On to 1s after Center-In. Colored lines show all individual 
trajectories for one example session. Panels at right show the same trajectories plotted as 
distance remaining from Center-In port, by time elapsed from either Light-On or Center-
In. Note that for non-engaged trials (green), the approach to the Center-In port 
consistently takes ~1-2s. Therefore, the epoch considered as “baseline” in the FSCV 
analyses (−3 to −1s relative to Center-In) is around the time that rats decide to initiate 
approach behaviors. (e) Extra [DA] causes longer average trajectories for engaged trials. 
Cumulative distributions of path-lengths between Light-On and Center-In, for (top-to-
bottom) engaged/lucky, engaged/unlucky and non-engaged respectively. Blue lines 
indicate laser trials, and p-values are from Komolgorov-Smirnov tests comparing laser to 
no-laser distributions (no-laser/laser trial numbers: top, 292/75; middle, 424/99; bottom, 
1897/792). On engaged trials rats often reoriented between the three potential start ports, 
perhaps checking if they were illuminated; one possibility is that the extra laser-evoked 
movement on engaged trials reflects dopaminergic facilitation of these orienting 
movements. If such a movement is already close to execution before Light-On, it may be 
evoked before the correct start port can be appropriately targeted. (f) Additional 
trajectory analysis, plotting time courses of rat distance from the illuminated start port. 
On non-engaged trials extra [DA] tends to make the approach to the illuminated start port 
occur earlier (note progressive separation of green, blue lines when aligned on Light-On). 
However, the approach time course is extremely similar (note overlapping lines in the 
final ~1-2s before Center-In), indicating that extra [DA] did not affect the speed of 
approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16.  Optogenetic effects on hazard rates for individual video-scored rats. 
Latency survivor plots (top) and corresponding hazard rates (bottom) for each of the four 
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TH-Cre+ rats with ChR2 stimulation at Light-On for which video was recorded (each rat 
had 3 video sessions that were concatenated for analysis). Only non-engaged trials are 
included (Numbers of no-laser/laser trials: IM-389, 522/215; IM-391, 294/125; IM-392, 
481/191; IM-394, 462/189). For each rat laser stimulation caused an increase in the 
hazard rate of the Center-In event ~1-2s later (the duration of an approach). 
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Chapter 3  
 
Dopamine conveys a value signal in cortical and striatal hotspots 
on a minute-by-minute timescale. 
 
Abstract 
 We recently demonstrated that dopamine (DA) release in the nucleus accumbens 
(NAc) signals motivational value, across both fast and slow timescales (Hamid, Pettibone 
et al. 2015). A critical remaining question is whether this is a global signal that provides 
similar information within all areas innervated by midbrain DA cells. To investigate this 
we performed minute-by-minute microdialysis in various subregions of medial frontal 
cortex and striatum, in rats performing a trial-and-error choice task. We replicated our 
finding that NAc DA correlates with reward rate, a proxy for the estimated value of work, 
and found that this value signal is specifically localized to NAc core rather than shell or 
dorsal-medial striatum. Within frontal cortex we also found a clear relationship between 
DA and reward rate, but focally within ventral prelimbic cortex rather than more dorsal 
or ventral subregions. These two “hotspots” of value signaling in rat cortex and striatum 
show an intriguing correspondence to human brain areas encoding subjective value in 
fMRI studies (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable 2013). We conclude that, rather than 
providing a uniform signal in all targets, or providing separate information to cortex and 
striatum, DA release is tailored to the computational demands of particular cortical-basal 
ganglia loops. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 Drugs of abuse and psychiatric treatments that alter dopamine tone can attenuate 
or amplify arousal, attention, learning, motivation and risky behavior.  Perhaps it is not 
surprising that there is currently a mottled view of the overall function of DA in the brain. 
In an attempt to clarify how DA can influence so many aspects of behavior, it has been 
suggested that parallel streams of information arise from the two distinct modes of 
dopamine cell firing (Niv et al. 2007).  Steady, ‘tonic’ firing alters extracellular dopamine 
over a slow time course and may selectively regulate parameters of motivation.  Phasic 
bursting events, on the other hand, are hypothesized to carry a learning signal—
specifically, the reward prediction errors (RPEs) of reinforcement learning models (A. A. 
Grace et al. 2007b).    
 Much evidence from electrophysiology and voltammetry supports this latter claim.  
In Pavlovian conditioning paradigms where a cue predicts a reward probabilistically, DA 
cells scale their response to rewarding events in proportion to the amount of surprise 
experienced (W Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997).  Additionally, DA cells can learn 
to anticipate reward after a fixed delay and will increase or decrease their firing when a 
reward occurs earlier or later than expected, respectively. This signal has also been 
observed at DA targets.  Sub-second extracellular DA fluctuations in nucleus accumbens 
correspond to reward predicting cues after repeated pairings but only occur at reward 
delivery early in training (Day et al. 2007), consistent with a learning/RPE signal.    
 Much less direct evidence has been gathered about motivation and tonic 
dopamine, possibly because ‘tonic’ DA is poorly defined.  Motivation is a broad concept 
and may be difficult to test its many sub-domains.  For example, tonic DA has been 
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proposed to scale overall vigor and arousal.  Amphetamine and other drugs of abuse that 
increase extracellular DA concentration certainly enhance reaction time, motivational 
‘wanting’ (Wyvell and Berridge 2000), and general ‘psychomotor activation’.  DA may 
enhance vigor directly by tracking recent reward history, or reward rate (Niv et al. 2007; 
Guitart-Masip et al. 2011).  Reward rate is equivalent to the opportunity cost of sloth, 
acting to invigorate action.    
 But ‘tonic’ DA has also been proposed to provide a directional influence (Beeler 
et al. 2010; Humphries, Khamassi, and Gurney 2012; Frank et al. 2009).  In this elegant 
account, DA tone can impact what is chosen by altering the explore/exploit balance.  
Here, DA is setting the inverse temperature, or the degree to which differences in value 
affect choice behavior.  This hypothesis is supported by the observation that mice with 
higher baseline DA (via dopamine transporter knockdown) show a sluggish response to 
changing reward contingencies, while maintaining similar rates of responding and 
learning rates compared to their wild-type counterparts (Beeler et al. 2010).  In a variant 
of this hypothesis, it has been suggested that DA regulates ‘thrift’, or the amount of 
energy that is expended or conserved in relation to net expected reward (Beeler 2012).  
This has direct consequences for optimal foraging in that low DA levels should reflect a 
state of low energy expenditure and promote an exploitative strategy (win-stay) while 
high DA signals an ‘energy rich’ state where energy conservation and frugality are of less 
concern.  
 In our previous work, we used microdialysis to measure DA on one minute 
timescales in the nucleus accumbens.   Our findings supported the reward rate hypothesis, 
but did not lend evidence to the ideas that DA modulates a general undirected arousal or 
shifts the direction of explore/exploit balance.  Moreover, this result mirrors our finding 
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that phasic DA in accumbens signals a moment-by-moment value function, which, like 
reward rate, estimates expected future reward.  While it is striking that accumbens DA 
correlated with just a single and specific component of motivation, DA cells project to 
multiple cortical-striatal loops which operate in parallel and facilitate distinct aspects of 
decision making (Pennartz et al. 2009; Cools 2015).  It could be the case that PFC DA is 
involved in more directional computations, such as setting inverse temperature or 
adjusting ‘win-stay’ strategy, while striatal DA is more activational, energizing vigor.   
 To better understand the contribution of ‘tonic’ DA more broadly, we repeated 
our previous dialysis study but sampled from several cortical and striatal targets.  First, 
we replicated our original finding— dopamine concentration in the nucleus accumbens 
core signals reward rate exclusively.  This same signal was found in the ventral portion of 
the prelimbic prefrontal cortex (pL-PFC), but not in the dorsal portion, the accumbens 
shell (NACsh), the dorsal medial striatum (DMS), the anterior cingulate (ACC), or the 
infralimbic cortex (IL).  These two ‘hotspots’ of reward rate coding provide evidence that 
(i) extracellular DA levels can fluctuate independently, by region, on a minute-by-minute 
timescale,  (ii) the DA signal in one, but not all cortical-stratal loops is consistent and (iii) 
both cortex and ventral striatum receive a value signal, but may use it for distinct 
purposes.  These results emphasize the importance of appropriate regional specificity in 
experimental manipulations of DA, and also highlight the implications of psychiatric 
manipulations that broadly alter DA tone (Kuroki, Meltzer, and Ichikawa 1999).   
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Microdialysis during the trial-and-error task 
 Rats performed a variant of our two-alternative trial-and-error task (Hamid et al., 
2015).  A single trial in the task proceeded as follows (Figure 3.1a):  At Trial Begin the 
center port was illuminated (Light On) until the rat poked it (Center In), which we 
defined as ‘latency’.  The poke was maintained for a brief (500-1500 ms) hold period 
until a white noise burst played (Go Cue), cueing the rat to withdraw from the center port 
(Center Out) and poke either of the now illuminated left and right ports (Side In).  A food 
hopper click immediately reported a rewarded trial upon noseport entry and was followed 
by pellet delivery on the opposite side of the chamber. Unrewarded trials were not 
signaled other than an absence of the hopper click.  Pokes were rewarded stochastically 
in a block-wise manner, with blocks randomly assigned from the set P(left reward): 
P(right reward) = [(80:80) (80:20) (20:80) (80:50) (50:80) (50:50) (50:20) (20:50) 
(20:20)]. Block lengths varied within session from 35-45 trials.  
 Our dialysis method allows a 1-minute sampling rate of 20 neurochemicals 
simultaneously.  Additionally, we recovered 100 samples in each region, in each 
session.  These features allowed for the unprecedented simultaneous sampling of 
dopamine targets in cortex and striatum at a time resolution that is physiologically 
relevant to important variables in our decision making task.  For example, rats attempted 
a range of trials in each minute (0-7 trials) allowing us to gauge their minute-by-minute 
vigor to perform.  Similarly, rats experienced a range of rewards (or omissions) from 
minute to minute.  Our 1 minute time resolution enables us to examine whether changes 
in extracellular [DA] reflect updates in decision variables that occur rather quickly over a 
handful of trials or more moderately within a block of trials.  
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Figure 3.1.  Simultaneous microdialysis sampling in cortex and striatum during the trial-
and-error task. (a) Schematic diagram of a rewarded trial. (b) Single session of choice 
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behavior. Reward probabilities are shown at the top of the panel. Each tick mark indicates 
choice (left = purple, right = green) and outcome (long = rewarded, short  = unrewarded). 
Thick traces show smoothed choice data (seven-trial smoothing) (c) Reward rate vs. 
latency. Latency data (cyan) is log-transformed and seven-trial smoothed.  Reward rate 
(back) estimate from leaky integrator model shown as a continuous trace. Upward 
deflections correspond with reward times (black ticks below x-axis).  (d) Reward rate vs. 
simultaneously sampled [DA] in pL-PFC and NAc core. Reward rate (thick black) is 
averaged across one minute of dialysate collection for comparison to [DA] (orange). (e) 
Coronal view of probe placements for single session data shown in a-d. Cross-
correlograms of reward rate and smoothed [DA] in pL-PFC and NAc core. Middle plot is 
the cross-correlogram of simultaneously recovered [DA] in pL-PFC and NAc core. Y-
axis is Pearson’s correlation coefficient and X-axis is the lag in minutes. In each panel, 
the [DA] signal is referenced to the reward rate signal.  Greyed-out areas in b-d represent 
minutes of inactivity that were excluded from some analyses to rule out the possibility 
that the strong DA:reward rate correlation was driven by dips in both reward rate and 
dopamine during these times. 
 
 
3.2.2 DA encodes reward rate in cortical and striatal ‘hotspots’. 
 The simplest estimate of reward rate in our task would be the number of pellets 
received per minute.  However, this estimate is rather ‘forgetful’.  Each minute treated as 
independent from the previous minute and it is unlikely that reward history is represented 
in this way.  A more flexible estimate would allow for a running average with a 
forgetting parameter that discounts rewards from the distant past.  Thus, we employed a 
leaky integrator model, which applies an exponential decay to each reward beginning at 
the moment of delivery (Daw, Kakade, and Dayan 2002; Sugrue, Corrado, and Newsome 
2004).  The value of the decay parameter, 'tau' (range = 1 to 1200s), was selected via a 
psychometric fit that maximized the negative correlation between trial latency and reward 
rate, based on our observation that the latency to engage is inversely related to recent 
reward history (Figure 3.1c).  We then averaged the reward rate within each minute of the 
microdialysis sample for comparison to the DA signal (Figure 3.1d).  
 We used regression analysis to compare the DA signal to reward rate in each 
region and found a clear, highly significant relationship between DA and reward rate in 
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NAc core (R
2
= 0.1190 , p= 1.3485e-16, 5/6 rats), replicating our previous finding. This 
relationship was also observed in an important cortical input to the core— the prelimbic 
cortex.  However, this result was unexpectedly confined to the ventral portion of the pL-
PFC (R
2
= 0.0953, p= 1.18e-14) with the dorsal portion showing no relationship (R
2
= 
0.0117, p= 0.0058, 6/7 rats).  In a manner consistent with cortical-striatal loops carrying 
similar signals, we did not see a correlation between DA and reward rate in either NAc 
shell (R
2
= 0.0027, p= 0.2657, 0/8 rats) or its neocortical afferent, the IL (R
2
= 0.0307, p= 
0.0019, 0/4 rats). Similarly, we found no correspondence between DA and reward rate in 
our most dorsal targets, the DMS (R
2
= 1.23e-05, p = 0.91, 1/10 rats) or the ACC (R
2
= 
0.012, p= 0.0078, 3/7 rats).  To visualize the regional DA:reward rate relationship, we 
verified the location of the probe membranes and mapped them onto representative atlas 
sections, color-coded by correlation coefficient (Figure 3.2a).  This mapping vividly 
compliments the findings of our regression analysis.    
 To get a better sense for the time course of the DA:reward rate relationship and to 
decouple our finding from a best fit to latency, we next looked at the correlation across 
all values of Tau (Figure 3.2b).  In general, we found that in hotspots DA significantly 
corresponds with reward rate over a wide, but strikingly similar range of decay values (2-
5 minutes).  Consistent with our regression analysis, we did not observe this relationship 
in other regions, at any value of Tau.  It is interesting to note that in IL cortex the 
DA:reward rate relationship is negative across the entire range, however the low number 
of sessions in the IL prohibits drawing a strong conclusion from this observation. 
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Figure 3.2. DA encodes reward rate in cortical and striatal ’hotspots’.  (a) Probe 
placements for all dialysis sessions, color-coded by DA correlation to reward rate. 
Chosen atlas sections are representative of average A-P or M-L placements for coronal or 
sagittal planes, respectively. The two leftmost coronal section panels show results from 
the current study, and the third coronal panel shows results from our previous study 
(Hamid, Pettibone et al. 2015).  Results from both studies are combined in the rightmost 
coronal panel. (b) Coronal view of cortical and striatal dialysis probe targets. (c) 
Summary of DA:reward rate correlation across multiple decay values (Tau), by region. 
For each session, DA was correlated against leaky integrator reward rate estimates using 
a range of Tau values (1-1200 seconds). The Pearson correlation at each value was 
averaged across all sessions in each region. 
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3.2.3 No relationship with choice 
 Higher reward rates reflect a higher value for performing the task, and should thus 
invigorate the decision to work. To test the complimentary hypothesis that DA encodes 
overall performance vigor, we regressed the DA signal against (i) the number of attempts 
in each minute and (ii) the averaged latency in each minute. In the model with just 
attempts we found a similar regional pattern to reward rate with DA significantly 
correlated to attempts in NAc core (R
2
 = 0.073, p= 1.60e-10) and the ventral portion of 
pL-PFC (R
2
 = 0.044, p= 2.27e-07).  However, in a model containing both reward rate and 
attempts as predictor variables, reward rate alone significantly contributed to model fit in 
both regions (stats).  Given that our reward rate estimate was based on a psychometric fit 
to latency, we expected to see a relationship between latency and DA, at least in regions 
that showed a relationship between reward rate and latency.  This is in contrast to our 
previous causal manipulation (Hamid, Pettibone et al. 2015), where optogenetically 
evoked DA immediately shortened latency, specifically on trials where rats were not 
already engaged (waiting near the noseport to begin the next trial).  Our regression 
analysis did not distinguish between engaged and non-engaged trial types, so by 
combining them the effect may be too weak to reach significance.    
 Finally, we sought to uncover whether DA may carry more directional 
information, especially in targets of the 'dorsal stream' such as DMS and ACC.  To test 
this hypothesis, we regressed DA against several 'choice' related factors.   First, we 
compared DA to the fraction of choices made to contra-versive or ipsi-versive ports, 
relative to implant side.  We found no significant relationship in any region.  Next we 
examined whether DA corresponds with aspects of inverse temperature.  In one model, 
we regressed DA with the fraction of choices made to the port with higher reward 
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probability in the last 50% of the block. This metric is a simplified framing of 'greedy', 
'exploitative' or relatively low-risk choices.  In a second model, we regressed DA with the 
probability of win-stay behavior in each minute, or the likelihood of repeating a choice 
given that it was rewarded on the previous trial.  We did not find a significant fit to DA in 
any region in either model.  For an abbreviated regression analysis summary of several 
behavioral variables and transmitters, see Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. Regression analysis. Bars represent R
2
 values for linear tests between each 
analyte (rows) and behavioral measures (columns). Negative relationships are reported in 
blue and positive relationships are in red. P-values were Bonferroni corrected (20 
analytes X 16 measures). To calculate reward rate, we averaged the reward rate in each 
minute of the dialysis sample. Attempts were calculated as the number of attempted trials 
(including trials that resulted in an error) in each dialysis minute. Latency was calculated 
by taking the average of the log10 latency in each minute.  Exploitation Index was 
calculated from the probability of choosing the port with the higher reward probability in 
the last 50% of the trials in blocks with a superior option (we excluded 20:20, 50:50, and 
80:80 blocks from the analysis). Cumulative Reward and Time were included in the same 
regression model to estimate satiety while accounting for slow timescale increases or 
decreases in analyte concentration within the session. Cumulative rewards represents the 
total number of rewards received by the end of the current dialysis minute and Time was 
simply the number of minutes elapsed since the session began. The bars in this column 
show color when only the cumulative reward variable was significant. %Ipsi 
and %Contra represent the fraction of choices to ipsi- or contra-versive ports in each 
minute, independent of block probability. P(win-stay) was the probability of repeating the 
previous of choice given the previous choice was rewarded. P(switch) was the probability 
of not repeating the previous choice, independent of outcome. 
 
 
 
3.3 Discussion  
3.3.1 Reward rate hotspots and subjective value 
 Reward rate can be considered an estimate of expected return on work, or 
temporally discounted value.  Estimating value is useful because it can determine 
whether or not an activity is worth performing, and how vigorously to engage in it.  Our 
present results reaffirm that DA fluctuations signal value in the form of reward rate, but 
in distinct 'hotspots' rather than ubiquitously throughout the brain. Both of these 
observations are in sharp contrast to recent electrophysiology recordings of VTA neurons 
which show a rather uniform and transient RPE response (Eshel et al. 2016).  If the 
terminal [DA] collected by our dialysis probes were a 1:1 reflection of the integrated 
dopamine neuron activity in (Eshel et al. 2015) we would predict that minute time scale 
DA would simply be the integration of RPE responses at reward outcome. In this 
scenario, [DA] would be highest during epochs in the task when rewards are most 
unexpected/rare and lowest when rewards are regularly occurring and unsurprising. On 
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the contrary, we observed that [DA] was highest during epochs of regular reward receipt 
and lowest during reward omission, similar to an online estimate of value. 
 The 'hotspots' of value coding correspond remarkably well with human fMRI data 
which reports increased BOLD activity exclusively in vmPFC, ventral striatum, and 
posterior cingulate cortex during tasks that engage subjective value (Kable and Glimcher 
2007; Levy and Glimcher 2012; Bartra, McGuire, and Kable 2013) (see Figure 3.4). Our 
results suggest that DA could be the principal driving force behind this non-specific 
signal.   
 
 
Figure 3.4. Subjective value ‘hotspots’ in fMRI BOLD signal.  Summary of a meta-
analysis of subjective value.  Red voxels in ventral striatum and vmPFC indicate there 
was more activity for positive effects compared to negative effects, and above-chance 
activity during choice and outcome epochs for monetary and primary rewards.  Adapted 
from (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable 2013). 
 
3.3.2 DA signals value in NAC core, but not shell. 
 We replicated our previous finding that DA in NAc core corresponds with reward 
rate. However, DA in the shell did not show this relationship. This is an intriguing result, 
which adds to the accumulating evidence of functionally distinct dopaminergic activity in 
core and shell related to reward, motivation, and drugs of abuse (S. M. Reynolds and 
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Berridge 2003; Vander Weele et al. 2014; Saddoris et al. 2015; Ko and Wanat 
2016).  NAc DA is critical for reward seeking behavior (K. C. Berridge and Robinson 
1998).   Broad DA depletion in the NAc causes rats to switch from effortful work to less 
effortful options when foraging (J D Salamone et al. 2007) and decreases responding on 
tasks with higher fixed ratios (J D Salamone et al. 2001).  Ko & Wanat (2016) showed 
DA in core but not shell was modulated with effortful engagement but not movements 
unrelated to reward.  
      
3.3.3 A dorsal-ventral divide in prelimbic dopamine function. 
 The finding that dopamine encodes rate of reward in prelimbic cortex is not 
new.  (St Onge et al. 2012) have shown that DA fluctuations (on 7 minute timescales) 
reflect reward rate in both instrumental responding and passive reward delivery. Beyond 
the difference in temporal resolution, one important caveat of this study is the spatial 
resolution.  The membrane length of dialysis probes used in St. Onge et al. were 2mm 
and spanned the entire prelimbic cortex.  Here we report that the special relationship 
between DA and reward rate is localized to the ventral pL cortex.  
 Our finding is consistent with important differences in the connectivity and 
functional roles of these subregions (Heidbreder and Groenewegen 2003). A dorsal-
ventral gradient of dopamine neurons in the VTA project to a ventral-dorsal gradient of 
medial prefrontal cortex (Deutch 1993).  Additionally, ventral areas of mPFC provide 
stronger reciprocal connections to DA cells than their dorsal counterparts (Sesack et al. 
1989).  The pattern of prefrontal cortex efferent connections also supports a picture of 
distinct function.  Dorsal pL-PFC and ACC send projections to sensorimotor cortex, 
DMS, and the more lateral NAc core and shell, while ventral pL-PFC and IL-PFC project 
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to medial NAc shell and core, hippocampus, amygdala, and pyriform cortex (Heidbreder 
and Groenewegen 2003).  One further interesting distinction, with perhaps important 
functional implications, is that the ventral area of pL cortex more densely projects to the 
mu-opioid receptor rich 'patch' subcompartments of the dorsal striatum and NAc core 
(Gerfen 1989).  These unique islands project directly to midbrain DA neurons and have 
been hypothesized to contribute to reward valuation via RPEs (Houk, Joel L. Davis, and 
Beiser 1995) or, more recently cost/benefit calculations (Friedman et al. 2015). Together, 
these findings reveal a special role for the ventral pL-PFC in strongly influencing DA cell 
population activity, directly and indirectly.  
 Lesions of the ventral prelimbic/infralimbic region impair reversal learning in rats 
(L. Li and Shao 1998) and 6-OHDA lesions in pL-PFC specifically impair the ability to 
detect changes in reward contingencies while sparing habitual responding (Naneix et al. 
2009).  Similarly, focal damage to human vmPFC abolishes reversal learning in both 
deterministic (Fellows and Farah 2003) and probabilistic (Hornak et al. 2004) task 
variants.  If these regions are indeed involved in choice flexibility, the DA value signal in 
the prelimbic hotspot may be used to inform the 'stakes' of the current 
decision.  Specifically, in a simple decision of whether to repeat the previous choice or 
switch to something new, the dopamine reward rate signal may be useful in influencing 
the probability of repeating the previous action.  By comparing information about what is 
to be lost by switching or, conversely, what is to be gained by repeating to the reward rate, 
a more accurate risk assesment can be made.  In the context of our task we did not see a 
relationship between DA and explore/exploit behavior, however the task design may be 
simple enough to not engage the more overt computational processes normally handled 
by the medial PFC. 
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3.3.4 Conclusion 
 Given this large-scale survey of so many regions and transmitter species that 
facilitate adaptive decision making, it is surprising that more relationships between other 
transmitters and behavioral variables were not observed.  Nevertheless, our primary 
finding that DA encodes value in cortical and striatal hotspots confirms and extends our 
previous work.  Dopamine uniquely provides a value signal during decision-making and, 
importantly, this signal is not ubiquitous but rather selective to subregions.  These results 
underline the importance of regional specificity in studies that rely on dopaminergic 
measurements and manipulations.  Future studies of dopamine cells and their targets will 
be necessary to clarify whether the heterogeneity of the observed dopamine signal arises 
in the midbrain or is achieved locally by terminal micro-circuitry. 
 
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Animals  
 All animal procedures were approved by the University of Michigan Committee 
on Use and Care of Animals. 10 male Long-Evans rats were bred in-house and 
maintained on a reverse light-dark cycle (12hr:12hr).  During training and experiments, 
rats were food restricted to 15 g of rat chow daily and given free access to 
water.  Animals were trained 3-6 months in computer-controlled five-hole nose-poke 
operant chambers (Med Associates).   
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3.4.2 Trial-and-error task  
 Autoshaping proceeded in the following sequence:  (Poke Any, 2 days) Rats were 
instructed to poke any of five illuminated nose ports, with no limit on hold 
duration.  Pokes were rewarded with a 45mg fruit punch flavored pellet (TestDiet 
#).  (Poke One, 1-2 weeks)  Rats were instructed to poke and hold their nose in 
single illuminated port for a variable hold period (500-1500 ms).  Poking an unlit port 
resulted in a wrong start (WS) error and a houselight timeout period (3-5 s). Poking and 
removing before the termination of the hold period resulted in a false start (FS) error and 
a houselight timeout period.  Training was advanced after rats performed >80% non-error 
trials for two sessions. (Probability 50-50, ~2 weeks) After poking a single lit port and 
holding for a variable delay (500-1500 ms), a white noise burst (Go Cue) instructed the 
animal to poke one of two adjacent illuminated ports.  Both left and right ports were 
rewarded randomly at 50% probability.  On rewarded trials, food hopper activation 
produced an audible click (‘Reward Cue’).  Unrewarded trials were not cued other than a 
lack of this click and omission of pellet delivery. To encourage responses to both left and 
right ports, a bias correction was implemented that allowed only three consecutive 
rewards to either side. The probability of reward to a favored side decreased to 0% until 
the opposite side was rewarded. Failure to choose either adjacent port within 1 second 
after the Go Cue resulted in a failure to respond (FR) error and a houselight timeout 
period. Training was advanced after rats performed >70% non-error trials for two 
sessions. (Probability Blocks, 1-2 months) The trial structure of this final stage is the 
same as the previous, with the exception of additional left and right 
reward probability blocks: [(80:80) (80:20) (20:80) (80:50) (50:80) (50:50) (50:20) 
(20:50) (20:20)]. Block probability order was randomly generated, as was the length of 
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each block (35-45 trials) within the session. Bias correction was not used in this stage. 
Rats were ready for implantation after performing >80% non-error trials for two weeks of 
daily training.  
  
3.4.3 Stereotaxic Surgery 
Rats were implanted bilaterally with guide cannula (Part #) in cortex and striatum 
in two groups.  The first group (n=6) received a guide cannula targeting pre limbic and 
infra limbic cortex at AP +3.2, ML 0.6, DV 1.4 from brain and a guide cannula targeting 
dorsomedial striatum and Nucleus Accumbens core/shell in the opposite hemisphere at 
AP +1.3, ML 1.9, DV 3.4.   Both implants were angled 5 degrees away from each other 
along the rostral-caudal plane.  A second group received a guide cannula targeting 
anterior cingulate cortex at AP +1.6, ML 0.8, DV 0.8 and a guide cannula targeting and 
Nucleus Accumbens core/shell in the opposite hemisphere at AP +1.6, ML 1.4, DV 5.5 
(n=2) or AP +1.6, ML 1.9, DV 5.7 (n=2).  Implant sides were distributed 
equally.  Animals were allowed to recover 4-7 days prior to retraining. 
 
3.4.4 Microdialysis  
 Sample Collection.  On testing day, animals were placed in the operant chamber 
with the houselight on. Custom-made concentric polyacrylonitrile membrane 
microdialysis probes (1 mm dialyzing AN69 membrane; Hospal, Bologna, Italy) were 
inserted bilaterally into guide cannula and perfused continuously (Chemyx Inc., Fusion 
400) with aCSF at 2 µL/min for 90 minutes to allow equilibration.  After 5 minutes of 
baseline collection, the houselight was extinguished, cueing the animal to task 
availability. Sample collection continued at 1-minute intervals and samples were 
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immediately derivatized with 1.5 µL sodium carbonate, 100 mM; 1.5 µL BzCl, 2% (v/v) 
BzCl in acetonitrile; and 1.5 µL isotopically labeled internal standard mixture diluted in 
50% (v/v) acetonitrile containing 1% (v/v) sulfuric acid, and spiked with deuterated ACh 
and Choline (C/D/N isotopes, Pointe-Claire, Canada) to a final concentration of 20 nM. 
Derivatized samples were analyzed using Thermo Fisher Accela UHPLC system or 
Thermo Fisher Vanquish UHPLC interfaced to a Thermo Fisher TSQ Quantum Ultra 
triple quadrupole mass spectrometer fitted with a HESI II ESI probe, operating in 
multiple reaction monitoring.  Five µL samples were injected onto a Phenomenex core-
shell biphenyl Kinetex HPLC column (2.1 mm x 100 mm).  Mobile phase A was 10 mM 
ammonium formate with 0.15% formic acid, and mobile phase B was acetonitrile.  The 
mobile phase was delivered an elution gradient at 450 µL/min as follows: initial, 0% B; 
0.01 min, 19% B; 1 min, 26% B; 1.5 min, 75% B; 2.5 min, 100% B; 3 min, 100% B; 3.1 
min, 5% B; and 3.5 min, 5% B.  Thermo Xcalibur QuanBrowser (Thermo Fisher 
Scientific) was used to automatically process and integrate peaks.  Each peak was 
visually inspected to ensure proper integration…. all 117,000 of them. 
  
 Chemicals.  Sodium carbonate, benzoyl chloride (BzCl), sulfuric acid, and salts 
for the small molecule neurochemical analysis were purchased from Sigma Aldrich (St. 
Louis, MO).  Water, methanol, and acetonitrile for mobile phases are Burdick & Jackson 
HPLC grade purchased from VWR (Radnor, PA).  All other chemicals were purchased 
from Sigma Aldrich (St. Louis, MO) unless otherwise noted.  Artificial cerebral spinal 
fluid (aCSF) was comprised of 145 mM NaCl, 2.68 mM KCl, 1.40 mM CaCl-2, 1.01 mM 
MgSO4, 1.55 mM Na2HPO4, and 0.45 mM NaH2PO4, adjusted pH to 7.4 with NaOH.  To 
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prevent oxidation of analytes, the aliquot of aCSF that flowed through the lines was 
spiked with ascorbic acid to a final concentration of 250 nM. 
 
3.4.5 Statistical Analysis   
 All neurochemical concentration data were smoothed with a 3-point moving 
average (y’ = [0.25*(y-1) + 0.5(y) + 0.25*(y+1)]) and z-score normalized to facilitate 
between-session comparisons.  Only data points from within the session were included in 
the analysis. Models were generated in a step-wise format using the regress function in 
MATLAB.  R values in scatterplots represent Spearman’s correlation. Cross-
correlograms were generated using the crosscorr function in MATLAB.  Error bars were 
generated for each subplot by shuffling one time series 100,000 times and generating a 
distribution of correlation coefficients for each session.  The 5,000th and 95,000th values 
for each session were averaged across sessions to calculate p = 0.05 error bars and the 
1,000th and 99,000th values were similarly averaged to calculate p = 0.01 error bars. 
 
3.4.6 Histology 
 Within two days of the final sample collection, rats were deeply anesthetized with 
isoflurane and intercardially perfused with Lactated Ringer’s solution followed by 4% 
PFA.  Brains were stored in 30% sucrose at 40 degrees C for ~24 hours and sectioned 
coronally at 50 um on a cryostat.  Sections with stained with cresyl violet (0.5% w/v) and 
imaged under normal light microscopy. Images were warped to correspond with 
equivalent atlas sections (Paxinos & Watson, 2005) using SqrlzMorph morphing software 
to account for any tissue shrinkage and distortion during processing. 
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Chapter 4  
Decision-making and valuation in dorsal striatal microcircuitry 
 
Abstract  
 The dorsal striatum is fundamentally involved in action selection.  Single-unit 
recordings have shown that the projection cells of the dorsal striatum flexibly encode the 
action values of reinforcement learning (RL).  However, exactly how action selection is 
achieved by the striatum remains poorly understood. Here, we explore the dorsal striatal 
micro-circuitry that is implicated in biasing action selection.  Specifically, we investigate 
electrophysiological differences in patch and matrix compartments, which have been 
hypothesized to encode reward prediction error (RPE) and action value, respectively. Our 
recent finding that mesolimbic dopamine encodes a temporal-difference value function 
offers a promising alternative hypothesis: patch cells encode an overall state value and 
matrix cells encodes specific action values. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Key features of striatal learning are remarkably similar to reinforcement learning 
models of adaptive decision-making (Daw et al. 2005).  In a simple Actor-Critic RL 
model, action selection is achieved by dividing responsibilities between two agents.  The 
‘actor’ selects among candidate actions by arbitrating between a set of action values and 
experiences an outcome.  A separate ‘critic’ then evaluates how different that outcome is 
 86 
from what was expected, based on the value of the action taken or the chosen action 
value, and generates a prediction error, or RPE.  The RPE is used to update a value 
function, or the state value, that is used to estimate the outcomes of future actions.  
Positive RPEs increase the likelihood of selection the same action in the future, while 
negative RPEs decrease the likelihood (Sutton and Barto 1998).  The actor-critic model, 
and a popular alternative, the Q-learning model, are useful for action selection processes 
that require little computational processing because only action values/weights are stored, 
similar to the way that instrumental associations can be stored in cortical-striatal synapses.  
The prediction error, provided during outcome epochs by the strong dopaminergic input 
to the striatum, is transient and serves no purpose after action and state values are updated.   
The striatum is composed of two anatomically and neurochemically distinct sub-
compartments. These compartments readily appear when labeled for mu-opioid receptors. 
The patch, or striosome, is rich in mu-opioid receptors and receives inputs from limbic 
and prelimbic neocortical structures (Eblen and Graybiel 1995). The matrix, void of mu-
opioid receptors, is receives inputs from sensorimotor cortex and projects onto the direct 
and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia.  Patch neurons project onto midbrain 
dopamine neurons, which project back onto striatal MSNs (Matsuda et al. 2009; 
Fujiyama et al. 2011). The observation of patch cells exerting an influence on dopamine 
cells has led to the hypothesis that patches correspond to the ‘critic’ in the RL framework, 
generating RPEs, while matrix cells correspond to the ‘actor’, selecting actions based on 
an arbitration between stored action values (Houk, Joel L. Davis, and Beiser 1995). 
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Figure 4.1. Two representative action-value coding neurons in dorsal striatum. Single 
units showing selectivity for left action values (A,B) and right action values (C,D). 
Traces and 3D boxplots show averaged firing rates for different block probabilities. The 
left action value unit is more active during the hold period when the probability of reward 
for left choices are 90% compared to 10%, independent of the probability of reward for 
choosing right.  The right action value coding unit show increased firing during lower 
right reward probabilities, independent of left reward probability. Adapted from 
Samejima, Ueda, and Doya 2005. 
 
 
 There are several key findings that support this dissociation.  Single-unit 
recordings in monkey have shown a large population of dorsal striatal cells that scale 
their firing with action values specific to a left or right choice (‘Q values’ in the Q-
learning nomenclature) (Samejima, Ueda, and Doya 2005). Specifically, in a 
stochastically rewarded two-alternative choice task, these cells show activity prior to 
action selection and scale their firing with the learned value of that choice while showing 
no relationship to the learned value of an opponent choice (Figure 4.1).  Additional work 
has since found striatal representations of chosen action value, with cells responding 
during trial outcome in a manner that scales with expected return on the selected action 
 88 
(H. Kim et al. 2009; Strait, Sleezer, and Hayden 2015).  
There is also accumulating evidence that patches contribute a unique evaluative 
signal. First, animals self-stimulate when stimulating electrodes are placed in patch, but 
not in matrix (White & Hiroi, 1998). Second, neurotoxic ablations of patch compartments 
cause deficits in motor learning tasks, but not motor performance (Lawhorn, Smith, and 
Brown 2009). More recently, putative patch cells have been implicated in cost/benefit 
evaluation in a task with appetitive and unpleasant stimuli (Friedman et al. 2015).  Finally, 
RPE-like coding has been observed in dorsal striatal neurons during a simple 5 tone 
classical conditioning experiment (Oyama et al. 2010). Here, animals learned that each 
tone predicted pellet delivery at a unique, fixed probability.  In roughly 9% of recorded 
cells, the firing rate at tone and reward epochs scaled with the amount reward expectation 
and surprise, respectively (Figure 4.2). The proportion of cells displaying this activity is 
congruent with the proportion of dorsal striatum composed of patch. 
 An alternative hypothesis emerges, however, when considering the findings 
presented in Chapter 2. We demonstrated that dopamine in the ventral striatum 
corresponds with a moment-by-moment value function, which is a TDRL state value.  
While this is in contrast to the simple RPE-coding function originally observed, we 
suggest that an important distinction between our study and previous work may be the 
task demands. In simple conditioning tasks where reward is not contingent on an 
instrumental response state value coding may look just like RPE coding.  However, in our 
task, the animal must orchestrate a sequence of responses to progress through several 
states in a single trial, with the final outcome being contingent on successful 
orchestration of the sequence.  Similarly, the RPE-coding neurons found in (Oyama et al. 
2010) may actually be coding a state value in a task with just two states.  Additionally, 
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representations of state value have been found in single-unit recordings in vmPFC and 
ventral striatum (Strait, Sleezer, and Hayden 2015; Lau and Glimcher 2005; H. Kim et al. 
2009)—limbic structures which, like patch cells, exert a reciprocal influence on the 
dopamine system.  Collectively, these observations implicate a special role for patches in 
the online evaluation of performance. In a computational framework, this may manifest 
as the encoding of prediction errors, or the state value of an actor-critic model.  
To examine whether patches participate in signaling a distinct value from matrix, 
we have been recording from neurons in the dorsal striatum during a probabilistically 
rewarded two-armed bandit task. Recording specifically from patches has been a 
longstanding technical challenge.  Patches take up a small total volume of striatum and 
their location is unique from animal to animal. Thus it is difficult to selectively target 
them.  Because of their non-uniform dimensions, it is also difficult distinguish which 
compartment an electrode was located in with reasonable spatial resolution.  The standard 
practice of electrode localization is to create an electrolytic lesion at the electrode tip.  
The damage left by electrodes is so small that is often impossible to detect where the 
electrodes were without these lesions.  However, this practice destroys local tissue and 
obscures immunohistochemical (IHC) labeling of mu-opioid receptors.    
To overcome these challenges, we have made a series of advancements in our 
approach, both in electrode type and histology methods, to recording from patches. Each 
refinement has pushed us closer toward the goals of clearly defined localization and a 
high yield of patch recordings.   
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Figure 4.2. RPE coding in dorsal striatum. (Top) Rasters and histograms of spiking 
activity from a single unit at each of five conditioned tones (rows) aligned to CS onset. 
The tone that predicted reward with 100% reliability (the least surprising stimulus) 
elicited a strong response during CS and a weak response during reward, while tones that 
were weakly predictive elicited a relatively stronger response.  (Bottom left) Spiking 
increases with reward probability during CS and decrease with reward probability during 
outcome (bottom right), consistent with an RPE signal. Adapted from Oyama et al. 2010. 
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Figure 4.3.  Summary of behavioral task and electrode placements.  (a) (Top) Schematic 
diagram of trial-and-error task, showing sample of behavior from a single session 
(bottom).  (b) (Left) 64-channel silicon probe array in sagittal section, inset shows tip 
detail. (Right) Location of electrode placements for 28-tetrode drives. (c) Rat implanted 
with a chronic tetrode drive in our 5-poke operant chamber. (d) Detail of tetrode 
construction and use (adapted from Buzsáki 2004).  Tetrodes were constructed by 
twisting four strands of Ni-Chrome wire together.  
 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Summary of localization techniques and effectiveness 
 We began our recordings using 64-channel silicon probes.  This probe design 
offered 8 recording sites at the tip of each of 8 shanks (Figure 4.3b).  Prior to insertion, 
probes were coated in the fluorescent lipophilic tracer, DiO, which is taken up by the cell 
membranes that it contacts, leaving a history of probe location.  In the event that a shank 
entered a patch, the tip of the shank would be easily co-localized with mu-opioid staining.  
However, while the 4 recordings from these devices resulted in 66 units, we did not find a 
single well-placed shank in a patch.  Two factors contributed to poor tip localization.  
First, tips were rather wide and often appeared to span multiple histology sections.  
Second, the DiO signal was absorbed by neighboring tissue in a non-uniform manner, 
resulting in clearly marked regions and weakly marked regions.  This decreased 
confidence in true electrode location.          
To ameliorate the issues of poor localization and low yield, we implanted drivable 
28-tetrode arrays (Figure 4.3b-c). Tetrodes are smaller in cross-section than the 
previously described silicon probes, and the recording sites are at the exposed tip (Figure 
4.3d). We reasoned that these finer features would decrease the amount of excessive 
tissue staining from DiO, decrease the likelihood that the tip would span multiple 
histology sections, and offer higher resolution when a tip was near the boundary of a 
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patch. Additionally, we used microglia marker CD11b during IHC to provide another 
dimension to our localization. Microglia are part of the immune response to tissue 
damage and provide an excellent visual history of the cell death and inflammation 
incurred as the electrodes pass through tissue.  We used a wide spacing between tetrodes 
to broadly survey the striatum and increase the chances of hitting a patch.  Across 5 
tetrode sessions, we recorded a total of 329 units. Of all 84 tetrodes, 2 tetrode tips were 
localized within a patch (entirely surrounded by patch), with a further 6 on the boundary 
(within 10-15 um of a patch).     
While this was an improvement, it was clear that this approach would not be 
tenable for generating enough data to test our hypotheses about patch function.  To 
overcome this we have again refined our approach to enhance tip localization and 
improve yield.  We have designed a new generation of silicon probes that have a smaller 
feature size than the previous generation (much closer to tetrodes). The probes are comb-
shaped with 32 shanks and 2 sites per shank, again increasing the chances of hitting a 
patch.  We continue to use the microglia cell marker CD11b during our IHC protocol, 
because it proved reliable in resolving tetrode locations. Next, we leave the electrodes in 
the brain during sectioning to keep them in the tissue until imaging.  Finally, we are 
slicing substantially thicker than usual sections (300-500 um) to increase the number of 
electrode tips in the same section and to minimize movement of the electrodes.  
Each of these techniques would likely be insufficient on their own to guarantee 
confidence in tip localization. When combined, they offer enough information to 
reasonably resolve patch vs. matrix placement.  We are actively recording with these 
probes and applying the updated histology techniques.  Preliminary histology results are 
promising (Figure 4.4).   
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Figure 4.4. New histology method for superior electrode tip localization. Left panel 
shows overlay of mu-opioid receptors (green) CD11b microglia marker (red) and silicon 
probe shank locations (white circles).  Probe locations are clearly encapsulated by 
microglia.  Middle and right panels display the 3-D reconstruction of a z-stack through 
the entire 500 um section at a slightly offset angle. Right panel shows CD11b staining 
only.  Scale bar is 60 um.    
  
 
 
4.2.2 Summary of electrophysiology recordings 
 We recorded single-unit activity in dorsal striatum using 64-channel silicon arrays 
and drivable 28-tetrode arrays. Across 9 sessions, we recorded a total of 395 well-isolated 
units, with silicon probes (4 sessions) yielding 66 units and 28-tetrode drives (5 sessions) 
yielding 329 units. Units were further culled by examining whether each unit was active 
(> 5 Hz firing rate) during at least one task epoch, yielding a total of 145 task-active units 
(44% of all units).  
We examined time bins around the Side-In event because different types of value 
coding should show distinct responses for choice and outcome (Figure 4.5).  In the two 
example patch units shown, it is clear that firing rate is responsive to trial outcome, with 
peak firing achieved within 1 second after Side In. The response is inconsistent, however, 
with one unit preferentially firing for omissions and the other firing for rewarded 
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outcomes.  The reward-preferring unit shows a delayed/shifted response for right rewards 
compared to left rewards. Interestingly, this unit is nearly silent for an extended period 
preceding the Side In on all trial types, but remains active for several seconds after all 
outcomes. There is a similar lateralization in preference in the unit activated by 
omissions:  While the peak firing occurs at nearly the same time for left and right choices, 
the firing rate is higher for right choices.  Of note, there is a slight ramp in firing rate for 
rewarded outcomes, but it diminishes rather quickly (within a second) compared to the 
sustained ~2 seconds of activity on omission trials. 
Similarly, matrix identified units showed a heterogeneous response to the Side In 
event. One of the cells showed activity both before and after the Side In event, with 
higher activity on rewarded trials at outcome.  This unit did not display a side preference 
during choice execution, but a preference emerged ~1 second after the outcome.   The 
other matrix neuron showed no activity until after the outcome when firing rate increased 
for all trial types. This unit displayed no side preference, but showed a sustained activity 
for several seconds after omissions.   
For a unit to be reasonably labeled ‘action value coding’ it should show activity in 
the period before the action is completed, and show a preference for direction.  I observed 
pre-Side In activity in one of the matrix cells shown, but no preference for direction was 
observed during this epoch.  Rather, this unit showed a higher firing rate for rewarded 
trials than omission trials, independent of choice.  Interestingly, there was a second peak 
in firing for left choices in the post-Side In period, independent of outcome.  Together, 
these observations suggest the cell is sensitive to differences in choice after the outcome, 
consistent with an action-value updating process.  
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 State value, on the other hand, is indifferent to choice and is only concerned with 
outcome.  Thus, choice-preference activity before outcome would rule out state-value 
coding.  While the patch units presented here showed some choice preference, there was 
a larger distinction in firing during the outcome epoch for both examples.  Both units 
showed activity after choice, similar to an Actor-Critic state value update event.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Single-unit recordings from identified striatal compartments. Four examples 
are shown (one per column; left two examples are patch neurons, right two examples are 
matrix neurons). In each case top panel shows histology of recording site, with mu-
opioid-receptors (patch marker) labeled in red and electrode track labeled in green (DiO 
or CD11b). Other panels show single neuron waveforms (across the four wires of the 
tetrode) and event-related firing during the trial-and-error task, as raster plots and firing 
rate histograms. Activity is divided up by chosen movement direction (left/right) and 
whether the trial was rewarded or not. 
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4.3 Discussion  
 The results presented here are necessarily suggestive, rather than supportive, of a 
particular hypothesis because of a low yield of well defined patch units.  Clearly, more 
recordings will be required before a clear picture of patch function emerges. These results 
do suggest that the previous approach we were using would require more recordings than 
are reasonable. Thus we have turned to new approaches. Future recordings will involve 
probes with increased channel count (256+ recording sites) and improved histological 
processing techniques. We have collaboratively developed silicon probes with smaller 
feature size and improved electrode density. We have also developed a refined approach 
to patch/matrix localization, which shows improvements on multiple fronts.  
First, leaving the electrodes through the entire process from implantation until 
imaging will in place will minimize the possibility of tissue damage and distortion that 
arises from post-fixation headcap removal and the many stages of immunohistochemistry.  
In previous experiments with silicon probes, I found inconsistent damage patterns across 
shanks in the same tissue. Leaving the shank in the tissue should improve confidence that 
I am looking at the true electrode track rather than a micro tear and allow an additional 
level of visual co-registration (Figure 4.4).   
Next, we have modified our labeling protocol to include the microglia marker 
CD11b.  Previous attempts with the lipophilic tracer were inconsistent from experiement 
to experiment, with some showing too much labeling to resolve the tip of the electrode 
and others showing too little.  The microglial labeling shows an obvious ‘scar’ around 
each shank that is consistent along the entire length of the electrode. 
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Finally, we have begun to perform thick slab immunohistochemistry combined 
with a tissue clearing protocol.  Thick slabs of tissue offer several advantages in this 
scenario.  Since the electrodes are left in the tissue, they must be sliced.  Taking thicker 
sections means taking fewer sections.  This minimizes the risk of electrodes falling out of 
the tissue during processing, minimizes damage to the tissue with fewer cuts, and 
maximizes the number of shank tips that will appear in the same tissue section.  The 
down side is that thick tissue impedes antibody penetration and increases light scatter 
during confocal microscopy, where the goal is to scan through small cross-sections of the 
tissue and reconstruct a stack of images.  To overcome these hurdles, we have altered our 
tissue processing protocol by increasing antibody penetration times and detergent 
concentrations. Additionally, we now clear the tissue of lipids and replace them with 
hydrogel to decrease light scattering, using a modified CLARITY (Chung et al. 2013) 
technique.  
 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Experimental Procedures  
 Adult male Long-Evans rats were group housed on a 12 hour reversed light-dark 
cycle. Training and testing occurred during the dark phase. Animals were restricted to 15 
g of rat chow daily and given access to water ad libitum. All procedures were approved 
by the University of Michigan Committee on the Use and Care of Animals. Training and 
testing occurred in sound-attenuated operant chambers (Med Associates, St. Albans, VT). 
Figure 4.1 shows a schematic diagram of the task. Each session lasted 2 hours, divided 
into blocks of 45-55 trials. At trial begin one of three central nose ports was illuminated 
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(Light On). The animal then poked and maintained his nose in the port (Center In) until a 
white-noise burst (Go Cue) was emitted. The animal then withdrew from the central poke 
and poked into the adjacent left or right nose ports (Side In). On rewarded trials, a food 
hopper delivered one sucrose pellet into a receptacle on the opposite side of the chamber, 
followed by an inter-trial interval (ITI; 5-8 s). Unrewarded trials were distinguished by an 
absence of sucrose pellet delivery, followed by the ITI. Left and right pokes were 
rewarded independently based upon a set of randomized block probabilities ([0.9L:0.1R], 
[0.9L:0.5R], [0.5L:0.1R], [0.5L:0.5R]. [0.1L:0.9R], [0.5L:0.9R], [0.1L:0.5R]).  Failure to 
correctly poke the center port, hold for the entire duration, or respond to the Go Cue 
resulted in a 5-8 second timeout and concurrent houselight illumination.  After two weeks 
of stable behavior ( > 80% non-error trials), rats were ready for implantation.  Behavioral 
electrophysiology methods including recording, spike sorting and cell classification have 
been described elsewhere (Gage et al. 2010; Leventhal et al. 2012; Schmidt et al. 2013). 
   
4.4.2  Histology.  
Rats were sacrificed under deep isoflurane anesthesia and perfused with Lactated 
Ringer’s solution, followed by 4% Paraformaldehyde in 1x PBS. After removal, brains 
were stored in 30% sucrose for 24-48 hours. 50 um sections were taken on a cryostat and 
stored in 1x PBS at 4 C. Tissue was labeled for mu-opioid receptors (ImmunoStar 24216, 
1:2000; Alexa Fluor 594, 1:500) and microglia marker CD11b (1:500 primary, Alexa 
Fluor 350, 1:500). All IHC steps were performed in dim lighting to prevent 
photobleaching of the DiO signal. 
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4.4.3 Thick section histology with intact electrodes 
 We have developed a new histological approach to enhancing electrode 
localization, which relies upon maintaining co-registration of the electrode in the tissue 
from the recording session until imaging. Rats are sacrificed under deep isoflurane 
anesthesia and perfused with Lactated Ringer’s solution, followed by 4% 
Paraformaldehyde in 1x PBS. After perfusion all skin, muscle and fascia are removed 
from the skull, as well as the entire lower jaw and olfactory turbinates. To minimize 
movement of the electrodes, all cranial plates surrounding the array are kept intact. The 
electrode array, including dental acrylic and anchor screws, is left attached. To remove 
calcium from the bone and facilitate slicing, the skull/drive assembly is next submerged 
in a chelating solution (20% w/v EDTA in 1x PBS) and shaken in the cold room for 8 
days. The chelating solution is changed every 48 hours to maintain a high concentration 
gradient. After 8 days, skull hardness is tested by attempting to cleanly slice a sliver (~ 
500 um) off of a lateral skull ridge with a scalpel blade. If minimal effort is required, the 
skull is transferred to a 30% sucrose solution for 48 hours.  
Prior to sectioning, voids between brain tissue and the skull are filled by a series 
of vacuum chamber sessions to improve consistency during sectioning. The skull 
assembly is submerged in a beaker of diluted O.T.C. cutting compound (20% OTC in 
30% sucrose solution, followed by 50% OTC in 30% sucrose solution).  The beaker is 
then placed in a vacuum chamber (15-20 psi) and allowed to rest 30 minutes under 
pressure until all air pockets are displaced.  Horizontal sections are taken on a cryostat at 
500 um thickness and placed in well plates with 1X PBS.  Sections with electrodes were 
immunostained for mu-opioid receptors and microglia cell marker CD11b.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this dissertation, I have developed a further understanding of the neural 
substrates involved in adaptive decision-making.  This work focused prominently on the 
signal conveyed by dopamine at its many cortical and striatal targets.  Here, I have shown 
data that challenges the widely held view that dopamine provides a prediction error signal.   
Additionally, I have shown that the dopamine signal is not ubiquitous, but rather relays 
distinct information within cortical-striatal loops.  I would like to conclude this work with 
a description of how my results fit into the current narrative of how dopamine informs 
decision-making and how my data fit into the decision-making literature more generally, 
with some observations and insights collected during the course of the experiments 
presented in these chapters. 
 
5.1 Do my results contradict the RPE hypothesis? 
 A standard RPE account of dopamine function predicts that dopamine exclusively 
signals changes in reward expectation. Indeed, putative dopamine neuron recordings have 
shown firing activity that scales during cue presentation with the probability that the cue 
predicts a reward. At reward delivery these cells display activity that scales with the 
amount of unexpectedness (Oyama et al. 2010). It is worth noting that these cells do not 
display a sustained activity from cue onset until reward delivery, but rather two distinct 
pulses at cue and outcome.  Following from these observations, and the dopamine = RPE 
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hypothesis more broadly, it would be predicted that during our task we would see, at 
most, these same two pulses at Trial Begin and at Side In represented in the phasic 
dopamine signal. The changes in dopamine at Trial Begin would reflect the likelihood of 
a reward and the changes at Side In would reflect the corresponding amount of 
unexpectedness of reward outcome. Alternatively, it may be predicted that a single phasic 
pulse would arise at trial outcome, signaling an RPE. Our measured dopamine response 
was far from these observations in several respects.  
 First, observed dopamine fluctuations early on in the trial but not at the earliest 
predictive cue (Center Light On), as a standard RPE account would predict. Rather, the 
dopamine consistently responded to the Center Nose In event, as the rat self-initiated 
each trial. Further, this dopamine rise during approach to the Center In was related to trial 
latency. As latency shortened, the dopamine ramped sooner, suggestive of a motivational 
drive to begin the trial. This interpretation may throw a flag to those more inclined 
toward an RPE interpretation. Indeed, it might be argued that short latencies correspond 
with higher rates of reward which likely co-occur with sequences of unexpected positive 
RPEs, thus driving elevated dopamine levels early in the trial. However, when dopamine 
was increased via optogenetic stimulation at outcome on the previous trial, there was no 
detectable effect on latency on the following trial. This result suggests that even 
immodest increases that mimic the largest RPE-like responses (completely unexpected 
reward delivery) at trial outcome are insufficient to promote enhanced vigor. 
 Secondly, if dopamine indeed signals RPE, sequential rewards should generate 
progressively smaller RPEs and, consequently, smaller phasic dopamine release events at 
Side In. Rather than observing changes in the peak level of dopamine at time of outcome 
on sequentially rewarded trials, we observed an equally high peak but a progressively 
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smaller difference between baseline and peak as rewards were sequentially achieved. In 
other words, the relative baseline dopamine level changed rather than the relative peak 
dopamine level. Baseline shifts were bidirectional, contingent on the sequence of 
outcomes (consecutive omissions resulted in lower baseline dopamine, while consecutive 
rewards resulted in higher baseline dopamine), consistent with shifts in the value of 
performing a trial rather than shifts in the impact of reward. 
 Finally, a major distinction between our observed dopamine signal and that 
predicted by the RPE hypothesis is the overall time course of the signal within a trial. The 
increases seen at Center In do not decay, but rather remain elevated until outcome.  
Consistent with an RPE hypothesis, a second increase is observed at reward delivery 
while a decrease occurs for omissions. Finally, on rewarded trials, the dopamine 
increases again until the rat has reached the food delivery port, at which time it 
immediately begins to decrease. The overall pattern is that of a ramp, punctuated by key 
task events, until reward is reached. The final increase until the reward port is not 
predicted by a standard RPE account. As the rat approaches the port, nothing new is 
being learned about the task and reward is certain.  The dopamine should decay after the 
food hopper click, or perhaps even stay level, if there is no RPE. Yet there is an upward 
ramp, suggesting that dopamine is still useful in the movement required to approach the 
reward.  Contrary to the RPE explanation, this observation fits nicely with a value 
function explanation because at the time just before reward acquisition, value is at a 
maximum. Indeed, it would be foolish for the rat to suddenly become disinterested in 
obtaining reward when it is most imminent.  We suggest that this epoch of time when 
dopamine is maximal is precisely the time when the value of expected reward is maximal. 
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5.2 RPE ramps? 
Alternative interpretations of ramping dopamine have been suggested by 
Gershman (2014) and Morita & Kati (2014). These interpretations are nested within the 
RPE framework and mathematically resolve how RPEs can behave as ramps rather than 
transient responses classically seen in Schultz experiments.  Gershman’s (2014) effort 
was made strictly to address the dopamine ramping observed in Howe et al. (2013) as rats 
approached a food pellet by traversing a maze arm. His account suggests that RPEs can in 
fact ramp as an agent’s proximity to a deterministic reward decreases. This ramping is 
achieved through a quadratic transformation of the proximity variable. Importantly, the 
model makes no predictions for (i) encountering cues which would suddenly impact the 
value of the ramping RPE or (ii) how the ramping RPE behaves in probabilistic tasks 
more generally or (iii) what the corresponding value function would look like, besides 
recognizing that “[the transformation] implies a spatial compression of the value function 
similar to Weber’s law, such that values of locations far from the goal are closer together 
than values of locations near the goal.”  
 Because of the limitations noted in point (i) and (ii), it is difficult to predict what 
Gershman’s model would predict for our task, which integrates spatial and non-spatial 
cues within a trial. The new ramping RPE is dependent upon proximity to reward only, so 
it may be the case that non-spatial cues (such as the food hopper click) would either have 
no effect on the ramping RPE or add an RPE to the ramping RPE. Unfortunately, the 
hopper click doesn’t provide information about spatial proximity— it only signals reward 
availability. As for point (iii), I did observe a nonlinear DA ramp. It was much less linear 
than that observed by Howe et al. but more like the value function Gershman suggests. In 
the averaged within-trial dopamine ramp, dopamine showed an exponential increase as 
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reward grew linearly closer in time.  Thus, sequential state values were similar early in 
the trial and grew increasingly disparate as the trial progressed. Ultimately, the new 
formulation of a ramping RPE signal does little to address the motivational component of 
dopamine.  It rather suggests that dopamine is exclusively concerned with learning, 
which does not connect with our observation that increased dopamine at the Trial Begin 
immediately invigorates work.  
 
5.3 Revising RPE 
  While none of these observations on their own is sufficient to dismiss the RPE 
hypothesis, together they provide substantive grounds for a revised view of dopamine 
function— a view that incorporates and explains many of the observed motivational 
phenomenon that occur as a result of normal and altered dopamine as well as dopamine’s 
effect on learning.  Schultz himself may very well agree to such a revision, yet he would 
not likely consider our account accurate.  Schultz describes the dopamine response as 
having two components (W Schultz 2016), rather than one continuous value component 
as we suggest. The early component at a cue is ‘activational’ and signals surprise and 
motivational salience.  The later component is evaluative, takes the form of an RPE, and 
persists until reward occurs.  Thus, Schultz would likely say our observed dopamine 
fluctuations are entirely predicted and have already been explained by existing accounts.  
Some of his recent writing even suggests that the RPEs that dopamine signals give rise to 
a temporally-discounted subjective value estimate (Stauffer et al. 2016; W Schultz, 
Carelli, and Wightman 2015). This subjective value can be used to inform a utility 
function, and RPEs are now ‘utility RPEs’.  
 The two component view may sufficiently describe the dopamine response in 
 106 
Pavlovian tasks that alter reward amount or type, or simple instrumental tasks with a 
variable delay between response and reward.  However, in self-paced instrumental tasks 
with multiple sequential responses the two-component view becomes 
cumbersome/unstable.  When does the ‘physical impact of the cue’ end and the 
‘evaluation period’ begin in such a task?  While there is no denying the presence of two 
dopamine events, it is quite possible that they are not carrying different information.  The 
value function account offered in these chapters does not make such a distinction, and 
thus offers a more parsimonious explanation of the data.  The value function describes 
expected reward proximity and changes in this expectation simultaneously and 
continuously.  In this way, it can account for the devaluation of distant rewards compared 
to closer ones, the learning that occurs when more or less reward unexpectedly appears or 
is omitted, and the motivational drives required to initiate work and to recover the reward 
when the work is completed. 
 
5.4 Is there functional difference between phasic and tonic dopamine? 
 The term ‘tonic’, as it applies to dopamine, has come to be used in a rather loose 
manner.  It is used at once to describe a method of measurement and a physiological time 
course. In the literature, ‘tonic’ has been applied to slow non-synchronous firing (~ 3-5 
Hz), slowly-evolving changes in extracellular dopamine concentration, and dopamine 
fluctuations measured by dialysis, usually over several minutes (A. Grace 1991; A. Grace 
et al. 2007). A couple of fundamental assumptions are being made when using the term 
‘tonic’ in this manner. 
 Firstly, it seems implicitly assumed that the dopamine measured at the terminal is 
roughly correlated with the dopamine cell population activity measured in the midbrain. 
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Thus, high levels of ‘tonic’ dopamine in the terminal must arise from increases in activity 
at the cell body and an increased proportion of non-silent dopamine neurons (Chéramy et 
al. 1990). This assumption is manifest in manipulations (or indeed models like 
Humphries et al. (2012)) of dopamine that broadly increase terminal concentrations via 
amphetamine or dopamine transporter knockdown (Beeler et al. 2010). These 
manipulations are said to mimic changes in tonic dopamine by specifically manipulating 
tone while leaving bursting intact, but it is usually unclear whether the authors are 
suggesting that the manipulations are mimicking the activity of dopamine neurons or 
simply dopamine tone. It has become clear that dopamine release can be modulated at the 
synapse, independent of cell firing.  Dopamine release can be triggered by presynaptic 
glutamatergic inputs from neocortex (Floresco et al. 2003) or synchronous local 
cholinergic input (Threlfell et al. 2015). Clearly, the term ‘tonic’ needs to be clarified 
when discussing measured dopamine vs. dopamine cell activity, rather than presuming 
they are equivalent. 
 Secondly, it is assumed that microdialysis measures ‘tonic’ dopamine exclusively.  
The assertion is that the dopamine signal measured by dialysis receives a negligible 
contribution from phasic burst events, because the dopamine released by phasic bursts is 
rapidly removed from the extracellular space by either transport or metabolism, or 
confined mostly to the synapse (A. Grace 1991; Nirenberg et al. 1997; Floresco et al. 
2003). However, this idea may be a byproduct of the fact that ‘tonic’ dopamine has been 
traditionally measured over tens of minutes or hours (Nieoullon, Cheramy, and Glowinski 
1978; Chéramy et al. 1990; A. Grace 1991).  On the other hand, if the critique collapses 
to whether or not a dialysis probe is measuring dopamine inside the synaptic cleft, the 
same critique could be applied to voltammetry, the currently favored technique for 
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measuring phasic dopamine (Phillips and Wightman 2004).  This is not to say that there 
are not two unique modes of firing, but rather that the relative contribution of each to the 
overall measured dopamine signal at the target may not be clearly distinguishable.     
 In their 2007 work, Niv et al. similarly suggest this may be the case— that ‘tonic’ 
dopamine may in fact be the time-integrated average of the phasic release events, filtered 
by re-uptake. Thus, the distinction may simply be a matter of the timescale chosen for 
measurement. While my observations are consistent with the hypothesis that ‘tonic’ 
dopamine (terminal dopamine concentration measured over a slower timescale) signals 
the rate of reward, they are distinct from the hypothesis as originally proposed by Niv et 
al. (2007) in a crucial way. Specifically, the authors proposed that tonic dopamine is an 
accumulation of phasic RPE events that integrate into a reward rate. While the RPEs are 
reactive, the reward rate is predictive in that it estimates future reward and thus 
modulates vigor. One testable prediction that arises from their logic is that particularly 
large RPEs, provoking correspondingly large increases in phasic dopamine, can be used 
to enhance vigor.  Our optogenetic increase of dopamine at reward outcome, selected to 
mimic the dopamine transients observed during unexpected reward delivery, had no 
impact on latency on the following trial. In other words, large RPEs on the previous trial 
do not enhance vigor on the next trial. Yet, it is the case that latencies are faster when 
reward rate is higher. Why?   
 We suggest that the moment-by-moment dopamine is encoding a value function 
rather than RPEs. As rewards accumulate, the baseline dopamine concentration increases 
and the expected value of doing the task increases. The baseline increase may be 
sufficient to drive vigor while the transient unexpected shifts in value (TD-RPEs) are not. 
On a slower timescale, this value and reward rate look very similar. Specifically, when 
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the sMDP model estimate of state values are averaged across one-minute time bins, the 
minute-by-minute value estimate is strikingly similar to the minute-by-minute reward rate 
estimate. Thus, I conclude that tonic dopamine is likely the time-smeared phasic 
dopamine, but that on both timescales dopamine is signaling value, rather than RPE.   
 
5.5 Measuring dopamine: Insights and Limitations 
 The data support the hypothesis that tonic dopamine is nothing more than the 
time-integrated phasic signal (Niv et al. 2007), however this comes with a couple of 
caveats.  While I show that mesolimbic dopamine (on what is normally considered a 
tonic timescale) is likely the averaged phasic signal, I also show that this underlying 
phasic signal is not RPE.  Rather, it is a continuous value function, estimating moment-
by-moment future reward, in which sub-second fluctuations report deviations in the value 
function.  These deviations correspond to delta, or the temporal difference error, in a 
TDRL model. Of course, to completely validate the claim that tonic [DA] is the same as 
phasic [DA], the most conclusive study would involve simultaneous voltammetry and 
fast-timescale microfluidic measurements.  This is the other caveat, and it is not readily 
addressed with the technology at my disposal.  
 One real hurdle was overcoming the limitations of measurement in each technique.  
The ideal measurement would provide a true baseline and offer a resolution that spans 
from sub-second to tens of minutes. The dopamine signal from voltammetry 
measurements ‘drifts’ over tens of seconds in a way that cannot be compensated for with 
filtering. As a result, the signal must be baselined at intervals, so a true baseline cannot be 
detected. On the other hand, it is increasingly difficult to reliably detect signal in 
increasingly small volumes of dialysate. One problem is that small deviations in the 
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pipetting of the three reagents into each sample can result in larger sample-to-sample 
measurement deviation (most especially deviations in the internal standard volume). The 
other problem is hitting a floor effect in the number of ions that can be detected by the 
mass spectrometer when trying to detect so many analytes. The 2 uL/min sampling rate I 
used was optimized to give the best sample-to-sample reliability (stability in total fraction 
volume) while staying at least an order of magnitude above the limits of detection for our 
analytes of interest.   
 
5.6 Dopamine and work    
The idea that dopamine is involved in the regulation of motivational effort has a 
solid experimental basis.  For example, Aberman, Ward, and Salamone (1998) showed 
that accumbens dopamine depletion decreases the amount of lever-pressing rats are 
willing to perform in a work-dependent manner.  Under the dopamine depletion condition, 
rats will press at a fixed-ratio requirement of 1 at a similar rate to control animals.  
However, as the fixed-ratio increases to 4, 16 and 64 the dopamine-depleted rats are 
increasingly less willing to lever-press. This general result has been replicated and 
expanded several times (J D Salamone et al. 2001; Ishiwari et al. 2004; J D Salamone et 
al. 2007). Before our experiments, the exact decision variable being carried by dopamine 
that enhances effort was not previously well defined.  For example, in the context of a 
utility function, dopamine could perceivably influence effort by conveying information 
about the net benefit, the net cost, or the overall utility of an action. In this framework, 
value would represent the net benefit of engaging in the task.   
 While I did not parametrically manipulate the work requirements, as is 
traditionally done by altering lever-pressing requirements via number of presses or force 
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required (J D Salamone et al. 2001; Beeler et al. 2010), the amount of work/effort 
nevertheless varies throughout the session. There are epochs of low reward probability 
and epochs of high reward probability that arise from the regularly changing block 
probabilities that the rats experience.  A worst-case scenario, assuming no procedural 
errors, would be attempting 10 trials to recover zero rewards while a best case would be 
ten rewards in ten trials.  I observed that rats decreased latency to begin a trial and 
increased the number of attempted trials in each minute as the rate of reward increased. 
Our finding that dopamine fluctuates with the minute-by-minute rate of reward and the 
moment-by-moment value is evidence that dopamine exclusively encodes net expected 
benefits of work, as opposed to a combination of costs and benefits.  This is consistent 
with prior similar reports measuring phasic dopamine during lever-pressing (Gan, Walton, 
and Phillips 2010) and the finding that dopamine cell firing during an instrumental 
decision-making task scales with net expected return (Morris et al. 2006).  
 
5.7 A distributed valuation system 
 Optimal decision-making has many components.  There are costs and benefits, 
risks and uncertainty, and preferences that change based on internal and external factors.  
Evaluating how to allocate effort and utilize learned information can be a tall order.  A 
wealth of previous work has uncovered traces of various aspects of this process, leading 
to speculation that specific subregions and neuromodulators offer unique contributions to 
a broadly distributed decision-making system. In light of this, the expansive 
microdialysis dataset I generated in Chapters 2 and 3 remains largely unexploited, but not 
necessarily unexplored. While I tested several behavioral variables related to performance 
(Reaction Time, Movement Time, Latency), outcome (reward rate, omissions, cumulative 
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reward, reward volatility, RPE, value), and choice (% ipsi, % contra, probability of win-
stay, probability of switch, and a Bayesian estimate of uncertainty of action values), the 
most prominent and replicated relationship was the dopamine:reward rate correlation. 
However, while the task I use throughout this dissertation is rich in decision-making 
variables, some variables may be under-expressed in the task and thus difficult to detect 
with the methods employed. I will next survey a sample of unresolved hypotheses and 
examine how my data fit into the broader literature of decision-making. 
 
5.8 Dopamine and adenosine: Complimentary roles in effort? 
 There is a strong overlap in the mapping of dopamine targets and adenosine 
targets in nucleus accumbens, with a special co-localization of D2 dopamine and A2A 
adenosine receptor subtypes (Hillion et al. 2002).  There is also a strong similarity in the 
impact of dopamine and adenosine on effort (John D Salamone et al. 2016).  On its own, 
A2A receptor agonism reduces lever pressing but increases the consumption of less-
preferred and easily obtained food (Font et al. 2008). Additionally, A2A agonism 
selectively decreases effort in tasks with high work requirements but not  low work 
requirements (Mingote et al. 2008). Interestingly, decreases in effort that occur under 
dopamine antagonism can be rescued by following up with A2A antagonism (Worden et 
al. 2009; Ishiwari et al. 2004), suggesting that adenosine and dopamine in the accumbens 
may interact to flexibly drive effortful behavior in a manner similar to a gas pedal and a 
brake pedal. 
 With respect to my own data, adenosine in the accumbens did not reliably 
correlate with my measures of effort (attempts/min, average latency).  However, this does 
not definitively rule out its role in shaping effort.  Many of the tasks in which adenosine 
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receptor antagonism decreased effortful engagement directly challenged metabolic 
energy expenditure in a non-trivial manner. Voluntary physical exertion was required to 
climb the barriers in Mott et al. (2009) or run the wheels in Correa et al. (2016).  It may 
be precisely this component of the effort equation that adenosine mediates.  Of note, 
dopamine antagonism has been shown to alter physical effort in a different manner from 
cognitive effort (Hosking, Floresco, and Winstanley 2015). My task does not specifically 
challenge voluntary physical effort and rats show no signs of fatigue within a session 
such as gradual slowing of latencies or number of trials attempted.  Importantly, there 
was a significant correlation between minute-by-minute accumbens core adenosine and 
dopamine levels (as well as between adenosine and dopamine metabolites), suggestive of 
the naturally interactive relationship hypothesized (Farrar et al. 2010).   
 
5.9 Serotonin and the cost of vigor 
 Serotonin has been proposed to provide an opponent role to dopamine, signaling 
an estimate of aversive outcomes and the opportunity cost of vigor (Daw, Kakade, and 
Dayan 2002; Boureau and Dayan 2011; Niv et al. 2007). In other words, as evidence 
against taking an action accumulates, the metabolic cost of repeating actions increases is 
reflected in concomitant fluctuations in serotonin. In this framework, a total utility 
function is generated by serotonin signaling the cost of vigor and dopamine signaling the 
cost of sloth. In the trial-and-error task, I would expect to see serotonin reflect the 
number of omissions in each minute, as the benefits of effortful work decline.  Similarly, 
the measured serotonin should change with latency as motivation decreases. Serotonin 
could also fluctuate with the probability of switching, as evidence against selecting the 
current option accumulates. The measured serotonin reflected none of these metrics.  One 
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reason may be the lack of a pronounced affective component in our task, such as a mild 
footshock punishment for incorrect responses. Several studies that manipulate serotonin 
have seen no performance effects in tasks that lack an affective component (Clark et al. 
2005; Evers et al. 2007). Another possibility is that the specific opponent effects of 
serotonin occur closer to the dopamine cell bodies, where serotonin has prominent, albeit 
mixed effects (Tsai; Gervais and Rouillard 2000). The lack of support for the opponent 
interaction hypothesis only highlights the importance of selecting tasks with an 
appropriate specificity for behavioral demands. 
 There are many other lines of questioning that can be pursued with this dataset in 
relation to other transmitters, including where and to what extent glutamate (Gleich et al. 
2015) and acetylcholine (Threlfell et al. 2012; Rice, Patel, and Cragg 2011) can shape 
dopamine efflux.  The set of analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 3 are by no means 
exhaustive, however, they do offer a glance across multiple decision-making circuits and 
neuromodulators. I propose that our trial-and-error task challenges the dopamine system, 
as evidenced by the reliable and robust relationships observed between value-related task 
variables, dopamine, and dopamine metabolites. 
 
5.10 Valuation in the anterior cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex 
Much recent work has placed a spotlight on the role of the ACC in optimal 
foraging. While traditionally well-observed in error monitoring, it has been argued that 
the ACC may in fact have a wider scope in processing a history of outcomes based on 
positive and negative evidence (Rushworth et al. 2007; Kolling et al. 2012).  Keeping 
track of a history is decidedly distinct from maintaining and updating a single decision 
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variable (like an action value).  In the context of foraging, this would manifest as series of 
events, each contributing a single piece of evidence for or against an action, with each 
piece actively contributing weight to the decision. Tracking both positive and negative 
evidence is similar net utility function, which is useful in determining which action is 
worthwhile to engage in.  Indeed, monkeys doing a reversal learning task with ACC 
lesions appropriately switched during the reversal phase but displayed an overall worse 
performance than controls (Kennerley et al. 2006).  This suggests an inability to actively 
maintain information about reward history. 
Imaging studies have revealed that the ACC and OFC are commonly activated 
together during decision-making tasks but are reported to participate in distinctive forms 
of evaluation (Walton et al. 2007; Kennerley, Behrens, and Wallis 2011).  Activity in the 
ACC has been shown to contrast recent outcomes against predicted outcomes, similar to 
performing subjective value estimations.  The OFC, on the other hand, has been shown to 
encode chosen action values with activity seen during choice and outcome epochs 
(Furuyashiki and Gallagher 2007; Y. Li et al. 2016; Kennerley, Behrens, and Wallis 
2011).  Additionally, the ACC and OFC diverge in the types of cost-benefit functions 
they perform in tasks that challenge effort allocation.  Lesions of the ACC resulted in 
preference toward the smaller reward/less effort arm of a T-maze while sparing the 
ability to outwait a delay for a larger reward.  Lesions of the OFC resulted in impulsive 
choices on a delay task while sparing the effort required for the larger reward in the T-
maze (Rudebeck et al. 2006). 
The idea that the ACC is critical for maintaining outcome history or some form 
net utility is certainly intriguing.  In my regression analysis I used a model that contained 
both rewards and omissions to see whether any of my analyte concentrations in the ACC 
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could be accounted for.  I did not find such a relationship, but this model is admittedly a 
rather crude way to approach utility.  Alternatively, it may be that the task is rather 
simple and does not rely on maintaining a reward history of more than one or two trials 
back, or possibly no single transmitter gives rise to these functions.  Even though I did 
not see a consistent value coding in my anterior cingulate placements, 3 out of 7 did show 
a significant correlation between reward rate and dopamine.  From the pattern of results I 
describe in Chapter 3, it is clear that the possibility of ‘hotspots’ should not be 
overlooked.  It has been suggested that subregions of the anterior cingulate (Walton et al. 
2007), as well as the orbitofrontal cortex (Walton et al. 2011), may well handle different 
components of valuation.  Indeed, in a meta-anlaysis of subjective value coding regions 
in human fMRI data, the posterior cingulate (but not anterior cingulate) emerges during 
trial outcome for positive outcomes only, and scales with subjective value estimates of 
available alternatives (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable 2013). It is possible that a distinct 
hotspot may emerge from a more exhaustive scan of this area.  
 
5.11 Behavioral flexibility and ‘sudden insights’ 
 There is a breadth of evidence that the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior 
cingulate, and dorsal striatum mediate the behaviors which regularly fall under the 
definition of ‘behavioral flexbility’, including reversal learning, set-shifting/task 
switching, and strategy switching (Durstewitz et al. 2010).  In particular, dopamine has 
been implicated in facilitating these behaviors (Floresco et al. 2005; Durstewitz and 
Seamans 2008; Tai et al. 2012). Across the many behavioral variables tested in my 
dialysis experiments, there was a decisive lack of evidence in support of dopamine 
fluctuations driving behavioral flexibility.   
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 One possible explanation for this result is that signals that mark behavioral 
switches are extremely transient and thus difficult to detect at the time resolution I 
measured with.  Ensemble recordings in the prefrontal cortex have shown that neural 
networks undergo abrupt transitions rather than gradual shifts during rule learning 
(Durstewitz et al. 2010).  Similarly, sudden changes in task structure that increase 
uncertainty about reward contingency alter PFC neural activity for only a handful of trials 
(Karlsson, Tervo, and Karpova 2012). Finally, in a reversal learning task, measured 
dopamine during a series of three reversals only increased during the first reversal, 
indicating that a relationship between dopamine and switching behavior is not only 
transient within a session, but may be difficult to detect in general (Van Der Meulen et al. 
2007). These results allude to the idea that during reversal learning there are transient 
‘sudden insights’ that prompt a shift in strategy.  If this were the case, our analyses would 
not have captured such a relationship. 
 
5.12 Concluding remarks 
 In this thesis, I sought to gain a better understanding of the circuitry underlying 
decision-making. This thesis challenges important ideas about dopamine function in the 
context of adaptive behavior. First, I challenge the dopamine= RPE hypothesis. I 
demonstrate that mesolimbic dopamine plays a role in learning and motivation by 
conveying a single signal—a value function. I show that this signal is not confined to the 
ventral striatum, but is shared by its afferent circuitry in the medial prefrontal cortex.  
This confirms that dopamine does not provide unique signals to cortical and striatal 
circuitry. The work presented here contributes to a more refined understanding of the 
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timing and functional connectivity of the dopamine system, which offers important 
implications for clinical manipulations of dopamine.  
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